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Abstract 
This study first offers a brief overview of Croatian history and political 
developments from the disintegration of Yugoslavia to Croatia's decision to apply for EU 
membership. It then explores the question of why the Croatian Government decided to 
apply for EU membership. Finally, it examines the opinions of the civil sector and public 
regarding joining the EU. The conclusions of this thesis are that the Croatian 
Government's main reason for wishing to join the EU has to do with identity and security, 
while the civil sector and the general public are primarily driven by economic 
considerations and the prospect of socio-cultural benefits. 
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CHAPTER! 
Introduction 
The end of communism in 1989 signalled a new era for the countries of Eastern 
Europe. Most Eastern European states quickly implemented democratic models of 
government, completed privatization of previously state-owned enterprises and opened up 
their national markets. The break-up of the former Yugoslavia initially slowed down its 
liberalization process, but the drive to join the European Union (EU) and the fundamental 
need for the newly formed states to cooperate to solve common problems overcame these 
early difficulties. By absorbing the Western Balkan region, the EU is trying to provide the 
framework for further cooperation among these countries. By doing so, the EU is helping 
transform the states of the region from communist regimes to functioning democracies, 
by promoting peace, stability, prosperity, human rights and the rule of law. 
By joining the EU, Croatia will be included in the map of a new Europe. The 
country is adjusting its political and economic institutions, aligning its legislation with the 
acquis communautaire and raising public awareness regarding the EU and the accession 
process itself. In order to join, the country needs to launch a series of comprehensive 
internal reforms to implement sometimes-painful political, economic, institutional and 
legal adjustments that will irreversibly change Croatia's socio-economic and political 
landscape. Therefore, one may ask why any country would choose the demanding and 
costly path that is the accession process and subject its people to a series of enormous 
socio-economic and political adjustments. 
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The Croatian government's application for EU membership was primarily driven 
by Croatia's need to confirm its European identity, to embrace Western values and to 
strive to become a liberal democracy. Croatia is also seeking security and wants to enter 
the EU collective peace system. Since the country is geographically positioned in one of 
the most turbulent parts of the world, Croatia is trying to protect itself from various 
external and internal socio-political and economic pressures and military challenges. As 
for Croatian civil society, the rationale for wishing to join has largely to do with the 
economic and socio-cultural benefits of EU membership. Croatian socio-economic 
progress looks almost guaranteed with accession to the EU, its market and the global 
trading system. If we disregard for a moment the rifts between transitional winners and 
losers, the liberalization of goods, services and labour among the Western Balkan 
countries and the consequent transformation of their industries and patterns of trade 
should have positive long-term effects. Moreover, by signing the Bologna Declaration, at 
the meeting of ministers in charge of higher education in Prague in 2001, Croatia has 
promised to adjust its system ofhigher education to guarantee quality education to all 
Croatians, thus ensuring the competitiveness of its human resources. The transfer of 
cultural mores, values, governance know-how and technical skills is an important part of 
the accession benefits, as these play the role of motivators. 
For this reason, independence, for Croatia, means its return to Europe. It is 
also a historic confirmation of Croatia's European identity. The European 
Union itself is a world of clear intentions: protection of democratic 
principles and human rights, spreading of freedom, security and law for all 
citizens, pre ervation of linguistic and cultural differences, and economic 
development founded on shared knowledge.' 
1.1 Political Developments Since the War of Independence 
3 
In the 1980s, the Eastern European communist states were facing erious political 
problems. People were losing their trust and interest in socialism, as the charm of 
democracy and free market capitalism was growing stronger. Yugoslavia, characterized 
and propelled by workers' self-management, was, in that regard no different than the rest 
of the countrie of the then-communist bloc. More prosperous Slovenia and Croatia were 
calling for free democratic elections and, ultimately, for separation from the rest of 
Yugoslavia, while Serbia, and its former leader, Slobodan Milosevic, were calling for the 
increased centralization of Serbia's two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. 
The crumbling of communist ideology was fuelling the rise of ethnic and religious 
nationalism among various groups in Yugoslavia. Calls for the elf-determination of 
Yugoslav republics and provinces were overlapping with calls for the unity of 
Yugoslavia. The growing ethnic feuds and overall frustration were being used by 
members of the ancien regime for their own purposes. Members of the communist 
nomenklatura, who were keen to maintain power, became fervent nationali t and 
"guardians" of their respective ethnic and religious groups. The introduction of a 
democratic multi-party system signalled the end of communism, but also the widening of 
socio-economic, political, religious and ethnic divisions as well as escalating pressures 
1 A statement by Antun Mahnic, a political attache with the Croatian Emba sy in Ottawa, Canada, and a 
representative of the Minjstry of Foreign Affair and European Integration. Interview with the author, 
19/02/2009. 
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and irreconcilable demands. Newly-formed political parties were fa hioned exclusively 
around ethnic and religious lines. 
Franjo Tudman, a former Yugo lav People's Army general grown political 
dissident, exploited the opportunity which arose from the volatile socio-economic and 
political conditions caused by the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. With the 
financial help of the Croatian diaspora, Tudman founded the ultra-nationalist Croatian 
Democratic Union (CDU) in 1989. At the first multi-party national election, the CDU 
won with an overwhelming majority and Franjo Tudman became Croatia's first pre ident 
a post he held in a tight grip until his death in December 1999. Immediately following the 
elections, the newly formed Croatian government declared Croatia' s sece sion from the 
rest of Yugoslavia. The EU recognized Croatia as a sovereign state in January 1992, and 
in May 1992 the country was admitted to the United Nations (UN). The new Constitution 
of the Republic of Croatia imprudently reduced the civil status of Croatia' s Serbs from 
"constitutive people" or a "nation" to a "minority". For Serbs, thi loss of status became 
the main issue of contention. During the years of socialist Yugo lavia the size of a nation 
within a particular republic or province had been irrelevant, and o the new liberal 
democratic emphasis on elections and electoral numbers meant that, as Stokes claims, 
"member of almost every ethnic group in the former Yugo lavia suddenly became 
frightened that they would be permanently relegated to the status of minority, outvoted in 
elections, pushed out of jobs, and otherwise discriminated against."2 
2 Gale Stokes, "From Nation to Minority: Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia at the Outbreak of the Yugosla 
Wars," Problems of Post-Communism 52, 6 (November/December 2005): 4. 
1.2 Croatian War of Independence 
According to Barry R. Posen, the security dilemma is particularly intense when 
both sides have similar offensive and defensive military power.3 However prior to the 
break-up of the former Yugoslavia, inflammatory language and irresponsible action by 
both sides had led to mutual mistrust and an analogous security dilemma, despite the 
asymmetric distribution of military power between Croats and Serbs,. Posen notes that: 
.. .in the spring of 1990, Serbs in Croatia were redefined as a minority, 
rather than a constituent nation, and were asked to take a loyalty oath. 
Serbian police were to be replaced with Croats, as were some local Serbian 
officials. No offer of cultural autonomy was made at the time. These 
Croatian policies undoubtedly intensified Serbian fears about the future 
and further tempted them to exploit their military superiority.4 
The Croatian challenge to the Yugoslav state was reinforced by German recognition of 
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Croatia, which, considering the German track record in the Balkans, further incited Serb ' 
fears about their identity and survival.5 German as well as Vatican support for an 
independent Croatia superficially confirmed the European origin of the Croatian identity, 
as opposed to that of the Orthodox Serbs and their supposedly Balkan identity. German 
support provided an important reason for the Croatian government to continue with its 
xenophobic language, which further provoked the already armed Serb paramilitary group 
seeking to avenge Nazi-Croatian war crimes. German support therefore helped set off, 
albeit indirectly, the war in Croatia. 
3 Berry R. Po en, ' The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Surviva/35 , I ( pring 1993): 28. 
4 Ibid., 38. 
5 Ibid. 
6 
Because of Croatia's dismal treatment of ethnic Serbs during the Second World 
War, fear spread among Serbs that the suffering endured under the Ustase6 regime would 
be repeated under the extremist national government of Franjo Tudman. Croats feared 
rising Serbian nationalism and potential regional hegemony in the form of a unitary 
Yugoslavia or a Greater Serbia. Unfortunately for both Serb and Croats, their fears were 
distorted, misrepresented and eventually exploited by members of the former communist 
regime, who managed to maintain their authoritarianism under the guise of nationali m. 
The clout ofthe League of Communists ofYugoslavia and the Yugoslav People's 
Army, the two most prominent institution in the former Yugo lavia, although waning in 
the years prior to the war of the 1990s, had occasionally been wielded at all political, 
socio-economic and civic levels, by reinforcing processes incompatible with the socio-
cultural background of the Yugoslav people as a whole. These communists-turned-
nationalists were able to use fear as an instrument of manipulation, and, ultimately, of 
political influence and control. According to Mungiu-Pippidi fear and not simply 
intolerance, was "the greatest determinant of ethnic nationalism throughout the region."7 
Unlike Slovenia, the other breakaway Yugo lav republic that experienced an easy way 
out of Yugoslavia, Croatia's insistence on separation from Yugo lavia escalated into an 
all-out civil war in which approximately 12,000 people lost their lives. Neither side had 
much interest in calming the situation; the Croats hoped that the escalation of the conflict 
6 Ustase - wa a Croatian National Sociali t terrori t organization which allegedly committed atrocities 
against Serbs, Jews and Gypsies in their pursuit of an ethnically pure Croatia during the Second World War. 
7 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Nationalism After Communism: Le sons Learned, (Budapest: CP Books, 2004). 
8 See Croatian Anny Colonellvan Grujic' s te timony at the trial of Croatian Serb politician Milan Martie. 
Available at http://www.iwpr.net/?p=tri& =f&o=261 066&apc _state=henh (acces ed 25 May 2007). 
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would draw attention to the Croatian cau e in the West9, while the Serbs wanted to break 
contact with the Croat separatists and therefore looked for a way to draw the Yugoslav 
Army into the conflict. In short, the Serbs, encouraged by Slobodan Milosevic and several 
hard-line Yugoslav Army officers, captured almost one third of Croatia and declared it a 
separate country. 
Ironically, the Serbs' fears about being discriminated against, victimized and 
expelled from Croatia were eventually fulfilled, after they confronted the Croatian 
government by military instead of democratic means. The Krajina Serb paramilitary and 
the Yugoslav Army committed serious breaches of basic human rights in the initial pha e 
of the war. The Croatian population suffered tremendously when the Serb paramilitary 
engaged in terrible atrocities and brutally expelled around 220,000 Croats from the 
Krajina region that was under their control. 1° Finally, the Croats launched two military 
offensives against the rebel Serbs in 1995 operations Flash and Storm, which ended the 
war by "cleansing" approximately 200-250,000 ethnic Serbs from Croatia.'' During that 
period, just like many ofthe Serb paramilitaries at the beginning ofthe war, Croatian 
soldiers started burning houses and looting property and engaging in mass killings of 
9 Franjo Tudman stated on at least one occasion that Croatia had "chosen" war over peace as the only way 
of achieving independence. See Mile Bjelajac, Ozren Zunec, 'The War in Croatia," 1991- 1995, The 
Scholars' Initiative Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies (January 2006). Available at 
http://www.salzburgseminar.org/ihjr/si/si/Team_7 _ Full_ Text_ Report. pdf (accessed 20 May 2007). 
10 The retum of expelled Croats is now almost completed with 218,000 retums. See The Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Croatia "Report on Croatia's Progress in Meeting 
Intemational Commitments Since 200 I ," 09/06/2006. p. 13 Available at 
http://www.osce.org/documents/mc/2006/06/ 19522_ en.pdf (accessed 25 May 2007). 
11 According to the Human Rights Watch (HRW), between 300,000 and 350,000 erbs left Croatia during 
the 1991 -1995 period. See the HRW publication "Croatia: A Decade of Disappointment," 04/09/2006. 
Available at http://www.hrw.org/enlnode/11222/ ection/2 (accessed 02 eptember 2007). 
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mainly elderly Serbs that had been left behind. 12 In November 1995, an agreement was 
reached in Dayton, Ohio between the warring sides in the Yugoslav conflict (i .e. Croats, 
Muslims and Serbs), which stopped the clashes between belligerents; in effect, freezing 
the conflict while still leaving numerous underlying problems and dilemmas unresolved. 
1.3 The Development of the Croatian Political System 
Since its independence in 1992, Croatia has been a parliamentary democratic 
republic. From 1990 to 2000 the country was governed as a sui generis semi-presidential 
system, with the president wielding a broad range of executive powers. Franjo Tudman, 
the first Croatian president, regarded himself as the winner of the Yugoslav wars and of 
Croatian independence. He wanted to give himself a free hand in opposing any future 
attempt, from either outside or inside, to re-establish a new Yugoslavia in any shape or 
form. Tudman even went as far as amending the Croatian Constitution to forbid Croatia's 
membership in any Balkan association of states that would ultimately lead to the creation 
of a new Yugoslavia.13 
President Franjo Tudman's isolationist nationalism and belligerent stance toward 
the EU further escalated tensions and placed Croatia much further behind other countries 
in the region in terms of its chances of gaining accession to the EU. His scepticism and 
negative response toward EU policies in the region stemmed from his opinion that 
support from European countries for Croatia's cause in the war had been inadequate. 
12 See "Serbs see new ' war crime' tape" BBC, 09/08/2006. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/llhi/world/europe/525861 O.stm (accessed 19 August 2007). 
13 De jan Jovic, "Croatia and the European Union : a long delayed journey," Journal of Southern Europe and 
the Balkans, 8, I (April 2006): 85-86. 
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Tudman thought that Europe had helped intensify the Yugoslav conflict by unnecessarily 
supporting Yugoslavia, the "darling of the West", for too long by impo ing sanctions 
against Croatia and its poorly equipped army. 14 Franjo Tudman regarded Croatia as the 
military and political winner of the Yugoslav breakup and a moral winner against 
indecisive and sceptical Europe. This is clearly indicated in one of his speeches, in which 
he argued: 
All international factors - from London, Paris and Rome to Bonn and 
Washington, and, of course, Moscow - favoured, cost what it may, the 
maintenance of the former Yugoslavia as the comer tone of the Versailles 
order in this part of Europe. When all political- diplomatic effort to keep 
Yugoslavia failed, the very same circles considered that independent 
Croatia could not survive, jeopardized as it was by the organized revolt of 
the Serb population in Croatia and the immense military upremacy of the 
Yugocommunist Army. All the European powers, together with the entire 
European Community and America and the United Nations, not only 
impassively watched the Yugocommunist and Serbian forces barbarically 
de troy Vukovar and other Croatian cities in the autumn of 1991, but even 
enacted the arms embargo in the Security Council. This meant nothing else 
but leaving barehanded, helple s Croatia at the mercy of the superiority of 
the Yugoslav Army, then considered to be one of the strongest military 
powers in Europe. 15 
First and foremost, Tudman saw Croatia as an emerging economic and military 
power in the region. The EU Regional Approach policies 16 were viewed as highly 
challenging and were promptly rejected on the grounds that the EU was trying tore-
establish a neo-Yugo lavia through some new regional arrangements, uch as the concept 
14 Ibid. 
15 President Franjo Tudman, "Topical issues related to the development of Croatia in given international 
circumstance ··;cited in Jovic, "Croatia and the European Union," 89. 
16 The EU Regional Approach policies were developed to implement the previou Dayton/Paris and Erdut 
peace agreement between the warring parts in former Yugoslavia and bring basic stability, peace and 
prosperity to the region. More information at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargementlproject -in-focus/regional-
cooperation/index_en.htm (accessed 19 August 2007). 
of the "Western Balkans". 17 The EU, lacking an effective counter- trategy to Tudman's 
isolationist policies, simply froze its relationship with Croatia until Tudman's death in 
December 1999. The current Croatian president, Stjepan Mesic, described his view of 
first Croatian president Franjo Tudman and his politics in these word : 
I left official politics at the moment when I split with the late President, 
Franjo Tudman. I did not share his views on policy towards Bosnia-
Herzegovina and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I also did not share his 
understanding of democratic processes; that is, Tudman simply did not 
understand them. Furthermore, he wanted to centralize power and 
resources to an extreme degree, and I wanted decentralization. Finally, I 
wanted to see Croatia become Europeanized and open toward Europe. I 
understood global trends and wanted Croatia to become member of the 
European Union as soon as pos ible, since that is, in my view, in our 
strategic interest. Tudman opted for isolation, and it wa only to be 
expected that we would split. 1 
The winners of the 2000 elections, President Stjepan Mesic and the late Prime Minister 
Ivica Racan, made entry into the EU Croatia's primary foreign policy objective, in the 
hope that Croatia would catch up with other transitioning Eastern Central European 
countries. After winning the elections, Mesic argued: 
Tensions have now ceased, and we will start serious discussions, since all 
of us have much more important tasks, like getting Croatia out of 
economic recession and paving the way toward establishing European 
standards and meeting European criteria, in order to achieve our strategic 
goal, membership in the European Union. 19 
Following Franjo Tudman's death in December of 1999, the CDU lost the 
10 
elections of the following year to a center-left coalition of six parties under the leadership 
17 The term Western Balkans was perceived by Croats as the EV's euphemism for a new Yugoslavia. 
President Franjo Tudman, "Topical issues related to the development of Croatia in given international 
circumstances"; in Jovic, "Croatia and the European Union," 89. 
18 See an interview with President Stjepan Mesic, .. Our goals can only be achieved through co-operation" 
Central Europe Review 2, 19 (May 2000). Available at http://www.ce-
review.org/00/ 19/interview19 _ mesic.html (accessed 2 October 2007). 
19 fbid. 
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of the late lvica Racan and his Social Democratic Party (SDP). The end ofFranjo 
Tudman's and the CDU's rule signalled a new beginning for Croatia. The newly elected 
government immediately changed Tudman's isolationist policies toward the EU and 
became more open to dialogue with other countries in the region. The 2000 parliamentary 
and presidential elections brought a visible transformation in both the attitude of the 
Croatian public and in concrete government policies toward the EU. The Croatian 
government became ready and willing to embrace new challenges, such as further 
political and socio-economic integration with the EU. In seeking accession to the EU, 
Croatia affirmed its determination to break away from Tudman' s isolationist policies and 
tum toward integration with the bloc. By fully cooperating with the International Court 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the government of Croatia signalled that it 
wished to embrace the EU's main values and principles- the rule of law, democracy and 
respect for human rights. Presidential powers were subsequently reduced and transferred 
to the government (Vlada), headed by the Prime Minister, and control of executive and 
legislative powers were transferred to the Croatian Parliament (Sabor). As a result of 
these changes the semi-presidential system was transformed into a pure parliamentary 
system. Also, the Constitution was amended and the bicameral parliament was brought 
together as one20 and was given back its historic name - the Croatian Parliament 
(Hrvatski Sabor). Moreover, the Constitution was also amended to oversee and protect 
Croatia's newly-acquired democratic structures, processes and procedures, but even more 
importantly, to defend and preserve the territorial integrity of the country: 
20 The Chamber of Counties or the upper house of the Croatian Parliament ceased to exist on 28 March 
2002. 
A political party shall be organized according to a territorial principle. The 
work of any political party which by its programme of activity violently 
endangers the democratic constitutional order, independence, unity or 
territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia shall be prohibited.21 
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Croatia's increased cooperation with the European Union (EU), the World Trade 
Organization (WT0),22 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Central European 
Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)23 indicates that Croatia is favourably, although 
inconsistently, committed to democracy and a free market economy. Despite considerable 
progress in its transition toward a genuine democracy, Croatia continues in fact to grapple 
with different transition-related problems. While current Prime Minister Ivo Sanader can 
be credited with resolute anti-corruption campaigns and better cooperation with the 
ICTY, as well as a more relaxed attitude toward ethnic and religious minorities, the 
country has yet to complete its transition process. In its annual survey of various 
European countries and their current state of affairs, the Economist painted this vision of 
the country: "Croatia's sullen and obstructive approach to pluralism, media freedom and 
the rule of law remains an alarming pothole on the road to further EU enlargement. 
Nobody wants to upset the murky and convenient status quo." 24 
21 From The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. Available at 
http://www.constitution.org/cons/croatia.htm (accessed 04 May 2007). 
22 Croatia has been a member of the WTO since 30 November 2000. See 
http://www. wto.org/englishlthewto _ e/countries _ e/croatia _ e.htm (accessed 15 July 2007). 
23 Croatia became a CEFT A member as of I March 2003 following the agreement ratification by Romania 
and Slovenia. Most of the original CEFTA members left the organization following their EU accession in 
either 2004 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) or 2009 (Bulgaria and Rumania). 
The current CEFT A members are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldavia, 
Montenegro, Serbia and UMNIK (on behalfofKosovo). 
See http://www.ukom.gov.si/cefta2003/eng/presidency/croatia/ (accessed 19 February 2009). 
24 
"Stars and soggy bottoms," The Economist, 04.01.2007. Available at 
http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=7933606&story_id=849 
1837 (accessed 22 August 2007). 
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1.4 EU Membership: the Final Stage 
Although slowly at first, the EU, along with a range of other international players, 
institutionalised channels through which they could disseminate information and provide 
the support mechanisms and networks needed for democratisation and overall 
development in East-Central, and later on, South-Eastern, Europe. Since the 1990s, a 
complete change in attitude on the part of formerly authoritarian countries toward the role 
of international agents in promoting democracy has made the impressive transformation 
of those countrie possible.25 
Since the wars in former Yugoslavia, the EU has recognized that a disregard for 
the affairs of bordering countries can prove too costly for both the wider, surrounding 
regions as well as for the EU. Discrepancies in prosperity and political stability between 
the EU and its neighbours can be detrimental to the overall interests of EU member tates. 
Violent conflicts, refugees, terrorism and organized crime, as well a disruption of energy 
supplies, trade and transportation links and overall political instability in the neighbouring 
regions can spill rapidly over into the EU and consequently impede the economic 
prosperity, stability and security of its citizen . 
Presently the EU is perceived as a non-traditional security actor26 with an 
acknowledged interest in the progress of its neighbours on all fronts, and e pecially in 
their socio-economic and political domains. Although a succe ful transition to 
democracy and a free market economy is ultimately the responsibility of those aspiring to 
25 Geoffrey Pridham, Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime hange in Post-Communist 
Europe, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005): 6. 
26 Boyka Stefanova, "The European Union as a ecurity Actor: Security Pro ision Through Enlargement," 
World Affairs, 168, 2 (2005): 51. 
-----------------------------------~~-~ -----
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EU accession, democracy, the rule of law and good governance are being promoted in the 
Western Newly Independent States (WNIS)27 and the Southern Mediterranean28 through 
the framework of the newest version of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).29 
The conditional nature of EU membership has been used as leverage in the pre-accession 
process to encourage potential members to embrace Western values, embodied in 
democracy, free markets and private ownership, and to encourage security in 
neighbouring countries. The socio-political features of any modern, democratic, 
politically stable and economically prosperous country, such as security, socio-political 
cohesion, stability, dependability, predictability and trust are probably hard to tally, but 
are highly desirable benefits ofEU membership. 
According to lvica Racan, Croatia's late Prime Minister, Croatia was eventually 
recognized by the international community as a "democratic state with substantial human 
and economic resources", which helped the country be recognized as worthy of being a 
potential member of the EU.30 In May 2000, the European Commission acted on a 
Feasibility Report31 by proposing opening negotiations for a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA).32 In 2001 , Croatia managed to sign the SAA, which was proclaimed a 
27 The members are Belarus, Moldavia and Ukraine 
28 The members are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria 
and Tunisia 
29 
"On Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy," COM (2006) 726 final, Brussels, 4 December 
2006. 
30 lvica Racan in Gorana Dojcinovic, What Does Croatia Gain by the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement 
(Zagreb: Ministry of European Integration, 2002): 4. 
31 COM (2000) 311 "Report from the Commission on the feasibility of negotiating a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement with the Republic of Croatia" Brussels, 24 May 2000. 
Available at http://www.mvpei .hr/ei/download/200 1/08/02/Feasibilityl .pdf (accessed 2 November 2007). 
32 The SAA is a legal contract which positions Croatia as an associate member state of the EU. The 
associate membership creates a framework for further cooperation between member states and an associate 
~------------------------------------- -~ ~--- -
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crucial stepping stone on the way to establishing "a European future for Croatia."33 Prior 
to Croatia's 2003 application for EU membership, the head of the CDU, lvo Sanader, 
during a meeting with Otto von Habsburg, the last head of the Habsburg dynasty and a 
tireless champion of EU enlargement, first proposed the adoption of a resolution by which 
all parliamentary parties, through a general agreement, would assist the Croatian 
Parliament in seeking EU membership status. Sanader reasoned that the resolution would 
"determine strategic direction and understanding of plans regarding Croatia' s path toward 
the EU." 34 More importantly, the resolution fully departed from and disregarded the 
Tudman-era constitutional amendment Article 141 , which prohibited any emergence of a 
Balkan federation of states in the Constitution.35 During the following parliamentary 
debate regarding the resolution, some minor disagreements were registered regarding 
Croatia's relationship with Bosnia and Herzegovina and regarding the International Court 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the return of refugees and privatization. 
However, despite these conflicting concerns and interests, the Croatian Parliament was 
able to reach a party-wide consensus regarding the EU accession and passed the 
member and helps the country for candidacy and eventual full membership. This includes, in general, 
agreements on political, socio-economic, cultural and security issues. 
33 From Chris Patten's statement which followed signing the SAA agreement between the EU and Croatia. 
The EU press realise "Stabilisation and As ociation Agreement between the EC and Croatia signed today." 
More information available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do ?reference= IP /0 I I 1503&fonnat=DOC&aged= I &language=E 
N&guiLanguage=en (accessed 22 August 2007). 
34 Ivo Sanader quoted in Vjesnik, 17 December 2002. Available at 
http://ns l .vjesnik.com/Pdf/2002%5Cl2%5Cl7%5C01A !.PDF (accessed 22 August 2007). 
35 Article 141 (2) asserts that, " It is prohibited to initiate any procedure for the association of the Republic 
of Croatia into alliances with other states if uch association leads, or might lead, to a renewal of a South 
Slav state community or to any Balkan state form of any kind." Full text available at 
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icllhrOOOOO _.html (accessed 20 February 2008). 
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resolution.36 Representatives of the twelve biggest Croatian political parties, from both 
sides of the political spectrum, signed the "Resolution on the Accession of the Republic 
of Croatia to the European Union" on 18 December 2002.37 On 21 February 2003, Croatia 
applied for EU membership, which initiated the formal process of Croatia's accession to 
the EU. The application was accepted on 18 June 2004, and Croatia officially became an 
EU candidate. The country's short-lived unwillingness to cooperate with the ICTY had 
somewhat stalled the process, but finally, in October 2005, Croatia initiated accession 
negotiations. Some negotiating chapters are more complicated than others; for example, 
the environment, regional policy and coordination of structural instruments, judiciary and 
fundamental rights, foreign security and defence policy, finance and budgetary 
provisions. However, the Croatian government is relying a great deal on the shared know-
how and experience of the previous EU candidates. 
36 According to the former Prime Minister Racan, one of the explanations for such prompt parliamentary 
approval was the fact that Croatia wanted to be viewed on an individual basi , which increased the 
possibility for Croatia to catch up with other Central European countries in its accession to the EU. Out of 
112 MP, Ill voted in favour of the Resolution with one ab tention. Presently, however, chances for a 
speedy Croatia's entry are rather slim. More information available in Vjesnik, 17 December 2002. 
http://ns l.vjesnik.com/pdf/2002%5Cl2%5Cl7%5C02A2.PDF, Vjesnik 20 December 2002. 
http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2002/12/20/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c= l (accessed 22 August 2007). 
37 The Resolution on the acces ion of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union, Zagreb, 18 December 
2002. The Resolution affirmed that, " .. . that the strategic foreign policy priority of the Republic of Croatia 
is a full-fledged membership in the European Union, which has proved to be a nucleus and area of stable 
peace, freedom, democratic values and high standards ofliving, respecting universally recognized 
principles and conventions for the protection of human and minority rights, persevering in efforts aimed to 
complete the transition of the economy into an open market economy in order to accelerate the process of 
economic development to the benefit of all the citizens ofthe Republic of Croatia, developing good 
neighbourly relations and resolving open issues with all its neighbours, engaged in regional co-operation 
and determination to act towards the strengthening of peace and stability in whole of Europe .. . " The full 
text of the Resolution in English is available at 
http://www.mingorp.hr/UserDocslmages/zakonjugovorieng/Resolution%20on%20the%20accession%20of 
%20the%20Republic%20of"/o 20Croatia%20to%20the%20European%20Union.pdf (accessed 3 September 
2008). 
r---------------------------------------~--------
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In addition to meeting the EU's stipulated conditions and overcoming the general 
scepticism in the EU over the Union's "absorption capacity", Croatia might also be forced 
to wait for EU institutional reform, which is deemed to be a necessary precondition for 
further enlargements.38 Nevertheless, according to the EU Enlargement Commissioner 
Oli Rehn, Croatia is "the next country on the list" regardless of the date. 39 
38 See "Sarkozy calls for freeze on EU enlargements," EurActiv Network 13 January 2006. Available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/sarkozy-calls-freeze-eu-enlargement/article-151511 (accessed 3 
September 2008). 
39 See "Rehn: Croatia will not join EU before 2010," EurActiv Network, 9 June 2006. Available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/rehn-croatia-join-eu-201 0/article-156042 (accessed 3 September 
2008). 
CHAPTER2 
The Croatian Government's Rationale for EU Accession 
The point of negotiating with the European Union (EU) can be 
described as-the complete and full transformation of Croatian 
society ... By becoming a member of the Union, Croatia will enter the 
system of collective peace and security, and will participate in the 
process of decision-making.40 
Vladimir Drobnjak, the Croatian Chief Negotiator with the EU 
For the Croatian government, accession into both the EU and NATO (The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization) are considered the most important strategic foreign policy 
goals. The Croatian government views the EU integration project as an ideal collective 
peace system, while NAT041 , in contrast, is viewed as the cornerstone of the European 
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security structure and a tangible collective defence organization. While the EU confronts 
security challenges by cooperation and diplomacy at multiple levels across different 
regions and cultures, NATO, with its military forces, bases, command-and-control centres 
and, most importantly, the enduring leadership and commitment of the United States, 
40 Interview with Vladimir Drobnjak, chief Croatia 's EU negotiator, in "Drobnjak: pristupanje EU je 
hrvatski strateski cilj" (Drobnjak: EU accession is Croatian strategic goal), Croatian Radio Television 
News, 17 October 2005. http://vijesti.hrt.hr/ShowArticles.aspx? Articleid= 1357, Cited in De jan Jovic, 
"Croatia and the European Union: a long delayed journey," Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 8, 
I (April2006): 87. 
41 NATO accession, unlike the one to EU, does not enjoy popular support. One of the main reasons for 
such tepid welcome ofNATO accession among Croatian citizens was that 76% of them, according to the 
Promocija plus opinion poll, were for NATO referendum and greater democratic engagement on the part of 
citizens. Instead, the bill on ratification of the NATO accession was pushed through the Croatian Parliament 
requiring just the majority ofMP votes in favour. Strangely enough, all the deputie in the Parliament voted 
in favour of Croatia's accession to NATO -except one, an independent deputy Dragutin Lesar. Prime 
Minister Sanader even admitted aN ATO referendum would jeopardize Croatia's NATO accession: 
"Remember that only a year ago the leading opposition party asked for a referendum. If we had agreed to it, 
we would be nowhere today." Other reason against NATO accession were environmental degradation and 
rising Islamic terrorism. More information on http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?act_ id= 19414, 
http://www.seebiz.eu/en/politics/mps-vote-in-favor-of-nato-accession,4096, html, http:// 
www.ceeol.com/aspx/getdocument.aspx?logid=5&id=b91 a60d6-87 a9-4183-b 7fd-t9bb4088506b, 
http://www.natonareferendum.org/ (accessed 15 September 2008). 
r------------------------------------------------
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projects stability and confidence into the Balkans region. Croatia, in return, despite its 
relatively small size, can expect to exert an influence on future NATO projects and EU 
policies and defend its status, borders and economy within Euro-Atlantic institutions. 
While commemorating Croatia's NATO entry on April I , 2009, President Mesic stressed 
that: 
The Republic of Croatia has fulfilled one of its two foreign policy 
targets: to join the European Union and NATO. Today, the first of 
those goals has been achieved, we are becoming a full member of the 
NATO alliance, and by doing so, we have ensured security for our 
country. However, NATO is not only a military alliance but also 
protects democratic values, so by joining the alliance it is confirmed 
that Croatia has adopted and defends high democratic standards.42 
The two main motivational factors of the Croatian government seeking EU 
accession are the confirmation and consolidation of Croatian Western identity and the 
enhancement of Croatia's security. In essence, Croatia is becoming more open and 
willing to embrace new regional co-operational experiments. It has ceased to fear that 
closer relations with neighbouring countries will lead to a re-emergence of a regional 
identity incompatible with that of the EU. The Croatian government's current official 
viewpoint is that Croatia's interests, identity and security are best protected within Euro-
Atlantic structures. 
Firstly, the major problems for Croatia ostensibly stem from its geographical 
position in the Balkans and the symbolic and real threats that the Balkan "powder keg" 
42 
"Albania, Croatia join NATO" Herald Sun, 2 April2009. Available at 
http://www.news.com.au/heraldsunlstory/0,21985,25277916-5005961 ,OO.html (accessed 2 April 2009). 
,-------------------------------------------
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represents. The Croats43 do not feel that they historically, culturally or even ethnically 
belong to the Balkans. They argue that the Croatian identity fits with 'Mittleuropa' , and 
therefore Croatian political allegiance now goes to the EU and NATO. 44 For Croats, the 
Balkans option is a frustrating alternative of isolation, economic failure, low levels of 
education, general destitution and, most importantly, a threat to their identity and geo-
political image. Unlike Yugoslavia, a member of the Non-Aligned Movement which 
flirted with both the East and West, Croatia has chosen for itself a less ambiguous path. 
According to Prime Minister Sanader, Croatia has already aligned itself "with the West 
and will be a part of the EU and NATO politics."45 
Secondly, the current Croatian government believes in collective security and 
peace among European states that share the same democratic values, culture and 
institutions, despite the fact that the actions of the Croatian government under Tudman 
during the 1990s were isolationist, problematic and hostile.46 EU integration was a 
decision made by the post-Tudman political elite in order to promote and enhance the 
country's security from possible external and internal threats, consequently increasing 
Croatia's ability to cultivate a favourable economic environment. This would also 
increase Croatia's chances of achieving long tern1 sustainable development, thereby 
43 The term 'Croat', as well as 'Serb' , is an ambiguous label and may refer to Croats or Serbs living in 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and/or Serbia. 
44 Croatia' s GOP stands at € 15,628, which puts the country ahead of some EU member states such as 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. See GOP comparison report at 
http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Europe/Croatia/gdp-per-capita (accessed I 0 September 2008). 
45 Prime Minister Sanader commenting after the US announced their intention to ratify Croatian application 
to NATO. "New York: Uskoro Americka ratifikacija clanstva Hrvatske u NATO-u" (New York: Soon 
American ratification of Croatian membership in NATO". Vinkovci (23 September 2008). Available at 
http://vinkovci.com.hr/vijestilhrvatska/new-york-uskoro-americka-ratifikacija-clanstva-hrvatske-u-nato-u/, 
(accessed 25 September 2008). 
46 Dejan Jovic, "Croatia and the European Union": 94. 
,--------------------------------------- ----
improving its social, economic, cultural and environmental well-being. Prime Minister 
lvo Sanader states that: 
Croatia's commitment to the principle of regional cooperation is 
substantiated through active participation in numerous regional political 
and economic initiatives. The EO-oriented policy the Croatian government 
has pursued in recent years has resulted in the awareness that a stable and 
prosperous Croatia is an engine for stability and prosperity in the 
neighbouring region.47 
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2.1 Europe vs. the Balkans Identity Debate: Resolving the Conundrum 
Since its independence in 1991 , Croatia has put a lot of effort into protecting the 
two key symbols of its nationhood - sovereignty and national identity.48 Croatian national 
discourse has been centered around democracy and democratic processes, with the main 
emphasis being placed on Croatia's evolving democratic values, norms, culture and 
identity as the determinants of its future domestic and foreign policy. Croatia did not want 
47 Ivo Sanader, "Leading a successful transition: the case of Croatia" Eur View (June 2008): 97. 
48 Identity theory shows that key functions of a state are the creation of a national identity and the 
standardization of a national language as an important indicator of its uniqueness. This also encompasses 
creation of a Self-Other, or Us-Them, relationship. Human beings have a psychological need to socialize, 
and hence a need to belong to something greater, such as an ethnic group, tribe, nation or even a 
civilization. The subsequent socio-political identification increases their self-esteem and social 
cohesiveness by comparing their own unit to others. The comparison with others does not necessarily entail 
negative perceptions or connotations, but often does, particularly in cases of national or ethnic 
differentiations and confrontations. William Connolly (1991) argues that " identity requires differences in 
order to be, and it converts differences into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty." A basic need 
for inclusion and positive in-group evaluation sometimes involves a negatively perceived out-group. A 
potential threat to a group's image and identity is a principal indirect strategy in identity construction and 
consolidation. Buzan, Wrever and Wilde ( 1998) maintain that the fear that "we will no longer be us" and 
"no longer the way we were or the way we ought to be to be true to our identity" can be employed to defend 
a collective identity highly susceptible to securitization. Social cohesion of a group increases when leaders 
invoke fear, construct historical myths, and exaggerate contrasting in/out differences and past encounters 
with the antagonistic and devious Other. The exchange of threats and counter-threats reinforces mutual 
mistrust and often leads to a "spiral of escalation", further aggravation and the aforementioned security 
dilemma, subsequently making everyone involved feel less secure. For more information see: William 
Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press 1991 ); Barry Buzan, Ole Wrever, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1998). 
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to be excluded from EU membership, thereby being disqualified from obtaining a 
European identity and becoming a 'normal' and peaceful EU member state embracing 
Western culture and values. President Stjepan Mesic, at a regional meeting with other 
Western Balkans' statesmen in Montenegro, expressed this position: "Our region has to 
be Europeanised, not because of Europe, but because of ourselves. Because the European 
concept is a concept of peace. "49 
Croatian independence from Yugoslavia was a goal that should have brought the 
country back to Europe. Being part of the EU was, and still is, considered the ultimate 
catalyst for the recognition of Croatia' s European and Christian identity. The return to 
Europe of the countries that were considered a part of the East prior to the fall of the Iron 
Curtain was a popular rhetorical theme used by the Croatian political elite to help create a 
Croatian national identity, increase the country's socio-political cohesion and prevent the 
return to power of former communists once the democratic system had been 
institutionalized. Throughout the 1990s, Croatia began to increasingly identify with 
Western democracy, and wished to detach itself from the Balkans in order to achieve 
greater socio-economic prosperity and politico-military security. Croatia's Europeanism 
was also frequently mentioned in order to rationalize and reinforce its decision to separate 
from Yugoslavia and join the EU instead. President Tudman made this clear in a 1991 
speech in which he provided both reasons 'to struggle f or' and ' to fight against' by 
indirectly invoking the Europe vs. the Balkans dichotomy: 
49 President Stipe Mesic, 16 November 2006. Milocer, Montenegro 
http://www.predsjednik.hr/default.asp?ru=296&gl=200611200000006&sid=&jezik=2 (accessed 2 1 March 
2008). 
We hope that the European countries and the EU will understand that the 
Croatian struggle for its territorial integrity, its freedom and democracy is 
not only the fight of the Croatian nation, the fight against the restoration of 
socialist communism, but the fight for normal conditions when Croatia can 
join Europe, where she historically belongs. 50 
To be considered a European, in the Croatian context, was to differentiate oneself from 
the Yugoslav or Balkan identities. 51 Croats liked to portray themselves as being more 
educated, progressive, industrious, successful and tolerant than their Yugoslav 
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counterparts, who were supposedly indolent, thick-headed, narrow-minded and fanatical. 
A new, supposedly enlightened and forward-looking avant-garde identity was sought 
after, in order to strengthen Croatia's new orientation toward Western institutional 
communities and facilitate its transition toward a free-market economy and a democratic 
political system. In this way, Croatia was looking to detach itself from the Balkans, a 
turbulent region which threatened Croatia's national identity. By invoking its European 
Christian heritage and supposedly freeing itself from the Balkan identity, however, which 
implied Croatian departure from Yugoslavia, the country put itself in a precarious 
security position vis-a-vis the other successor states. Ironically enough, the enlightened 
intentions of many Croats were undermined by Tudman's xenophobic anti-Balkan 
policies. 52 
Croatia can be said to belong to three regions: the Balkans, Central Europe and the 
Mediterranean region. All three regions are easily discernible in Croatian culture, values 
5° Franjo Tudjman quoted in Nicole Lindstrom, "Between Europe and the Balkans: Mapping Slovenia and 
Croatia's "Return to Europe" in the 1990s" Dialectical Anthropology 27 (2003): 3 17. 
51 The construction of"Europe vs. the Balkan " dichotomy or "the civilized West vs. the backward 
Balkans" very much resembles Edward Said's work on Oriental ism and a construction of a despised alter 
ego, or the Other, in order to emphasize the superiority of the Western civilization over Arabo-Muslim 
f:eople, their culture and their way of life. Edward Said, Oriental ism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994). 
2 Dejan Jovic, "Croatia and the European Union": 92. 
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and norms. During the 1990s, the Croatian government and its president were 
aggressively trying to inflate Croatia's Central European identity. For example, in a 1998 
New Year's interview with Croatian Television, Franjo Tudman repeatedly insisted that 
Croatia belonged to Central Europe and the Mediterranean region. He condemned the 
EU's Regional Approach policy and its representatives, who he claimed wanted to return 
Croatia to the Balkans by deception by calling the new association, which Croatia was 
about to join, the "Western Balkans". 53 For Tudman, the Balkans were the Balkans, with 
or without the adjective "Western". He saw the EU as being too much under the influence 
of France, Great Britain and the US, and Jess so under Germany, a Central European 
country which would recognize and further the interests of another Central European tate 
such as Croatia. 54 He viewed the "Balkan" identity, however, with much disgust, 
shunning it and treating it as a repository of all the negative characteristics and influences 
over Croatia one can possibly imagine. At the same time, in the arne pugnacious fashion, 
anybody who was associated with the Balkans or recognized as having a Balkan identity, 
regardless of their nationality, was despised, mocked and discriminated against, 
excepting, of course, Tudman and his clique, whose behaviour was tolerated. Hysterical 
national chauvinism and fear of Serbs, Yugoslavs, Chetniks, Communists, and Orthodox 
Christians, and the persecution of these groups, were all justified on the ba is of the 
53 Franjo Tudman, interview for HTV, in Vjesnik, 30 December 1998. 
http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/ l998/ l2/3l/Teme%20dana.htm#TD (accessed 16 February 2007). 
54 Ibid. 
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supposed threat they posed to the Croatian nation, "one of the oldest in Europe,"55 and its 
freedom. 
Moreover, the Croatian language was reconstructed for the purpose of 
differentiating the 'true' Croats from the rest of the Balkan people. Tudman's use of the 
ancient Croatian language with newly constructed terminology, which differed sharply 
from the Serbo/Croatian language of socialist Yugoslavia, and the patronizing tone in his 
inflammatory speeches, furthered the West (Croatia) versus the East (the Balkans) 
dichotomy. 56 The divide was pushed to the point that Croats, a Slavic nation, were 
acknowledged as members of a different civilization, a civilization which did not 
encompass the Serbs or the Muslims. 57 The rift created fuelled tensions between the 
Croats and other nations in the eastern part of Yugoslavia, primarily the Serbs. Michael 
Ignatieffs book, The Warrior's Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, 
contains a great example of how the "Other" peoples, primarily the Serbs, felt perceived 
as being unworthy to share the European identity with the Croats. In an interview with an 
ethnic Serb soldier fighting Croatian neighbours in Mirkovci (which means the peaceful 
place), in the eastern part of Croatia, Ignatieff attempts, after some difficulty, to find an 
answer to how a Serb is different from a Croat: 
55 Franjo Tudman quoted in Gordana Uzelac, "Franjo Tudman's nationalist ideology," East European 
Quarterly 31 , 4 (January 1998): 453 . 
56 There are about one thousand newly constructed Croatian words. Many such words are new constructs 
and were not used by Tudman, but he was one of the first people to bring this newly constructed language 
into play. Presently, language competition awards are given (2000kn or around $400 per word) to those that 
can come up with words that would replace foreign expressions or terminology. Popular examples are: 
svemrdje (internet), smecnjak (garbage dumpster), istinomjer (polygraph), skrbnina (alimony), raskruzje 
(roundabout), zrakomlat (helicopter) etc. More information at 
http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2006/1 0/20/Clanak.asp?r=kul&c=5 (accessed 23 September 2008). 
57 Ibid., 454. 
Look, here's how it is. Those Croats, they think they're better than us. 
They want to be gentlemen. They think they're fancy Europeans. I'll tell 
you something. We're all just Balkan shit. 58 
Although Serbs and Croats are very much alike, the soldier's view of the Croatian and 
Serbian identities is very different. According to Bjelic, who was first to analyze 
Ignatieffs revealing interview, the Serb soldier's " ... spontaneous self-orientalization 
reveals his internalization of the hygienic fault lines between European 'purity' and 
Balkan 'danger'."59 
2.2 Croatia and the EU: Security Matters 
" .. .it was necessary to clear doubts and provide information about what the 
European Union is and what it will become to be able to complete the 
European unification process and then define and possibly redefine the 
term Europe which is not only a geographical, but also a political term. We 
must agree that the border of Europe is not some river or a mountain, but 
that the border stretches as far as European values, tradition and culture 
do."6o 
The EU project, regardless of its imperfections, is arguably the most ambitious 
political undertaking in history. It has been called "the most advanced political 
achievement of our time".61 The contemporary "new world order" imposed by a single 
superpower, the US, is considered by some as "self-defeating and no longer 
58 In Dusan Bjelic, "The Balkans: Europe's cesspool," Cultural Critique 62 (Winter 2006): 33. 
59 Ibid., 35. 
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60 President Stipe Mesic in his address during the 'Croatia Summit 2005' , 14 October 2005. Zagreb, Croatia 
http://www.predsjednik.hr/default.asp?ru=252&gl=20051 021 0000004&sid=&jezik=2 (accessed 24 March 
2007). 
61 
"European Union called most advanced political achievement of our time Professor Calleo says," 
Camden Herald, 
http://www. mainecoastnow. corn/ articles/2 007/03/02/ camden_ herald/local_ news/ doc4 5e 7 Oc3 e480b04025 3 5 
439.txt (accessed 4 April 2007. 
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sustainable."62 An alternative future model of the current international system will 
probably resemble the EU in many respects; one in which a group of democratic, 
sovereign states unite together to create an institutional entity through which their socio-
economic, political and security goals are much easier to achieve. The EU has always had 
a long-term interest in promoting peace, security, democracy, and human rights in Europe 
and around the world. Robert Schuman, prior to the creation of the EU's and EC's 
predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), declared that the raison 
d'etre of the ECSC was to promote peace, stability and reconciliation between former 
rivals, principally Germany and France, by pooling resources, binding interests and 
promoting mutual values. He argued that a common economic system growing out of the 
ECSC would come to represent "the leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper 
community between countries long opposed to one another by sanguinary divisions."63 
The stress on democratic values is important in the security context. The EU had 
made it clear that only parliamentary democracies could aspire to join the organization. In 
1962, the Birkelbach Report, a predecessor of the present-day Copenhagen Criteria, 
stipulated that "only states which guarantee on their territories truly democratic practices 
and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms can become members of our 
Comrnunity."64 The European Union acknowledges democratic standards and processes 
as the Union's and member states' fundamental tenets and core beliefs, as inscribed in the 
62 Ibid. 
63 The EU at a glance, Robert Schuman, The Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, 
http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_ en.htm (accessed 2 March 2007). 
64 Quoted in Geoffrey Pridham, Encouraging Democracy: The International Context ofRegime Transition 
m 
Southern Europe (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991 ). 
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Maastricht Treaty on the European Union: "The Union is founded on the principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of 
law, principles which are common to the Member States."65 A leading promoter of 
democracy, the EU defines security as a fundamental precondition to its overall 
development.66 Better security stimulates economic growth and development, encourages 
foreign direct investments, discourages crime and builds people's confidence in a better 
future for their children and themselves. Security concerns are some of the main reasons 
for the EU's global promotion of and emphasis on democracy in its external relations, 
regional cooperation and conflict prevention. 
Although democracy is often regarded as the objective of this campaign, the idea 
behind it is that established democracies tend to be more peaceful in nature and are more 
inclined to respect human rights and freedoms. EU High Representative Javier Solana 
maintains that "the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed 
democratic states."67 
The security identity and interests of European democracies have been contested 
by a paradigm shift vis-a-vis security since September 11, 2001.68 The role of the EU in 
promoting global security is constantly changing due to globalization and EU market 
65See "Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union" Official Journal of the European 
Communities C325/5, 24 December 2002. Available at http: //eur-
lex.europa.eu/enltreaties/dat/ 12002M/pdf/12002M _EN .pdf 
Article 6 ( l ). " http://eur-lex.europa.eu/enltreaties/dat/ l2002M/pdf!l2002M _EN .pdf (accessed 20 
Septembre 2008). 
66 Javier Solana, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: The European Security Strategy" (Brussels, 12 
December 2003): 3. Available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/enlreports/76255.pdf 
(accessed 20 Septembre 2008). 
67 Ibid., 9. 
68 Anders Wive!, "The Security Challenge of Small EU Member States: Interests, Identity and the 
Development of the EU as a Security Actor," Journal of Common Market Studies 43, 2 (June 2005): 394. 
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expansion, while its security identity is becoming increasingly militarized. Consequently, 
small and insufficiently insulated European states lacking institutions capable of 
withstanding global pressures and external and internal security threats are in danger of 
becoming easy targets in a disorderly global environment. Small European states face an 
EU integration dilemma, being faced with a choice between adopting a great power 
security identity created by the EU or keeping their own traditional approach to security 
and conflict resolution, which, for most of them, emphasizes peaceful coexistence and the 
rule of international law. 69 A small state such as Croatia, which strongly identifies with 
the European character, fits perfectly into the EU collective security arrangement. 
However, as a rule, small states tend "to adapt to- rather than dominate - their external 
environment and seek influence through membership of international institutions."70 
Therefore, Croatia, and other small democratic states within the EU, provided they 
cooperate, will be the main beneficiaries of institutional security arrangements. By 
working through multi-level institutions, small EU states are able to wield disproportional 
power in relation to bigger states. The dilemma of choosing between autonomy and 
influence is significant for a new EU member, which through institutional integration 
becomes increasingly involved in, and committed to, EU affairs.71 
The EU itself is perceived as a non-traditional security actor72 primarily because 
of the changing security rationale in contemporary international relations, the EU reliance 
on collective peace among democratic European states and the EU employment of 
69 Tbid., 396. 
70 Ibid., 395. 
71 Ibid., 396. 
72 Boyka Stefanova, "The European Union as a Security Actor," World Affairs 168, 2 (Fall2005): 51. 
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conditionality as a tool in the pre-accession process to encourage potential members in 
changing their domestic and foreign policies. The EU framework is well-suited to defend 
its members on the world stage. Since the EU will protect Croatian interests abroad with 
regard to third countries, Croatia will identify its foreign interests with those of the EU. 
Ana-Marija Boromisa argues that: 
Croatia will become a part of a big block and will negotiate like the EU, 
especially toward third countries. If you take negotiations with the USA, 
Croatia alone is not a significant actor. Its negotiation position may 
influence decision-making within the EU, as well in negotiations with 
major powers. In this regard, the position of Croatia is changing. 73 
The EU has adopted a wide range of policies and procedures as well as legislative 
instruments in order to address such questions as police and judicial cooperation, border 
security and management and internal and external migration. Together with economic 
development, becoming a member within the EU area of justice, freedom and security is 
the paramount outcome of EU accession. Croatia will very likely continue with its 
democratic reforms, which will in tum positively shape its national as well as its 
emerging European identity. 
Moreover, Croatia has a serious organized crime problem which needs to be 
addressed, preferably before, but if necessary after, the country joins the EU. The issue of 
transnational Balkan organized crime is not a problem unique to just Croatia, but also to 
the Balkan region in general, where it originates.74 Organized crime damages the socio-
73 Interview with Ana-Marija Boromisa, Institute for International Relations, Zagreb, Croatia, in Euroforum. 
2007. Available at http://www.mvpei.hr/ei/download/2007 /08/23/euroform _ 16 _ hrvatski_ za _ web.pdf 
(accessed 23 August 2007). 
74 The Federal Bureau oflnvestigation labelled all groups originating from or operating in Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia as Balkan 
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economic, political and cultural fabric of a society, and it keeps evolving in a world going 
ever more global. As recently witnessed in Mexico, Bosnia and Kosovo, mafia groups are 
not just indiscriminately threatening civilians, but are also increasingly challenging the 
state itself. Criminal groups are forming sophisticated, well-connected international 
networks with broadened and diversified crime activities. The structure of mafia in some 
Balkan countries is still organized around families, clans and tribes (e.g. Albania, 
Kosovo, Montenegro, as well as the Serbs and Croats ofHerzegovina), which makes it 
easier for these groups to operate even in an unwelcoming environment. Those organized 
in clans and tribes do so for protection and mutual assistance, but organized family clans 
form a backbone of modem Balkan organized crime. Certain elements from these groups 
have already emigrated to the West, where they are regrouping, spreading and 
establishing their criminal activities (e.g. money laundering, human and drug trafficking, 
extortion, prostitution, gambling, etc.), all the while maintaining a home base back in the 
Balkans. Croatia is located on the so-called "Balkan route" used by organized crime 
groups to smuggle drugs and illegal immigrants into Western Europe. The Croatian 
government itself is ill-equipped to fight organized crime; new criminal trends and 
techniques have long evolved and country-wide police actions have only a minimal and 
short-term effect. 
Croatia's tough stance on organized crime reflects its concerns about entering the 
EU while riddled with problems menacing to the very existence of the Croatian state.75 
Organized Crime. More information at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/balkan.htm (accessed 24 
September 2008). 
75 Recently, Zagreb, the Croatian capital, bas been hit by a wave of mafia violence. The victims are hjgh-
flying individuals, such as a prominent lawyer's daughter, a crime reporter, a well-known indu trialist and a 
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Certainly, Prime Minister Sanader's government does not want to encounter problems 
similar to those which have befallen Bulgaria, the newest EU member, which saw its EU 
funding cut due to its unwillingness to fight crime at high levels of government and 
business.76 Not surprisingly, the EU does not want to see the disastrous Bulgarian model 
being repeated in Croatia, as it seriously breaches EU norms and obligations. The EU 
Parliament Rapporteur on Croatia Hannes Swoboda called upon the highest Croatian 
officials to arrange and execute a rapid, country-wide police action that would address 
Croatia's problem with organized crime. 
Furthermore, Croatia faces a continuing threat from extremist elements of all 
sorts, who share a willingness to employ violence to advance their respective causes. The 
most important groups are fundamental Islamist terrorists, whose activities are 
international in scope and involve different groups, networks and individuals driven by 
particular radical and violent beliefs. Croatia is highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks, 
even those not committed on its own soil, due to its booming tourist industry and its 10 
million visitors each year. The country has already suffered several acts of terrorism at 
home. The most notorious occurred in Rijeka in 1995, when an Islamic tetTorist 
organization, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya from Egypt, attacked a police station by driving a 
high-ranking city official. Consequently, Prime Minister Sanader fired his Minister oflnterior and Justice 
and the chief of the national police and hired experts with non-political backgrounds in order to make them 
less vulnerable to influence. He said that, "We will not allow, under any costs, Croatia and Zagreb or any 
other city to be an unsafe place to live. We will not allow organized crime to create the impression that 
anything can be done and that there will be no sanctions. It seems there are attempts to create this 
impression, which is why we will embark on the most determined fight against organized crime, against the 
mafia." Prime Minister lvo Sanader quoted in "Croatian PM sacks interior, justice ministers," People 's 
Daily Online, 7 October 2008. Available at http://english.people.com.cn/9000 l/90777/90853/651 0553.html 
(accessed 7 October 2008). 
76 The European Commission froze around 800 million euros of European funds in July of2008 for 
Bulgaria as it had not taken enough steps to fight "corruption at high levels and organised crime." See 
EUBusiness at http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1223377321 .26 (accessed 7 October 2008). 
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car loaded with explosives into a wall of the building, injuring twenty-nine people and 
killing the bomber.77 In response to this act Croatia became heavily involved in the 
global struggle against terrorism, even before the infamous terrori t attack against the US 
in 2001. However, by joining the EU it will officially become part of a global anti-
terrorist initiative, thereby committing it elf to the prevention of further attacks. This 
effort includes the detection, investigation and eventual disarmament of those involved in 
any manner in the development and trade of weapons of mass destruction. Countries 
aiding and abetting such terrorists are also a target of anti-terrorist efforts. Croatia will 
also, by cooperating with its EU partner , collect and share intelligence and extradite 
those suspected of propagating and conducting terrorism, and will therefore be able to 
fight a more elaborate, complete and matured anti-terror battle. Fear that Croatia will be 
pushed away from the EU and left to fend for itself will eventually ub ide amongst 
Croats, but former Prime Minister lvica Racan expressed this concern by stating that, ·'If 
the European Union, prompted by terrorist actions in America, create a sanitary cordon 
at its borders, the question is on which side of that cordon will Croatia be."78 
In order to tackle the problems of organized crime and terrorism, all Balkan 
countries must pool their resources and work together toward reinforcing the rule oflaw, 
strengthening their legal systems with a vigorous, impartial and autonomous judiciary, 
and building accountable and effective law enforcement and intelligence gathering 
agencies. The EU has to help countries in the region utilize the appropriate instruments 
77 More information available at http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/Newsbriefs/951 0/ 10-
21/am.html?iref-=newssearch (accessed 8 October 2008). 
78 lvica Racan quoted in "Croatia after terrorist attacks against the USA," A impress (Zagreb, 4 October 
200 I). Available at http://www.aimpre s.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200 II 0/ I I 004-007 -trae-zag.htrn 
(accessed I 0 October 2008). 
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and identify objectives, in order to enhance the human and institutional capacity for the 
fight against extremist groups. By joining the EU, Croatia will be better able to fight 
organized crime, terrorism and violence. It will consequently improve its security, 
influence judicial cooperation among countries in the region and acquire mechanisms for 
combating drug, human and illegal weapons trafficking as well as fraud and prostitution, 
thereby helping to reduce aggression and eventually eliminate the insecurities regarding 
public safety. Prime Minister Sanader pinpointed the importance of the EU and its peace 
system for Croatia, as well as for the region, when he argued that the EU: 
.. .is in our mutual interest, in the interest of progre and democratic 
stability of our countries, an important connecting component. We in 
Croatia consider this proces a unique significance to the southeastern 
region of our continent to tum the new page of its historical development, 
and through cooperation on mutual vision, to develop and improve all 
components of political, social, economic and cultural life of this part of 
Europe. Legally arranged and safe countries and societies, freed from dark 
sides of criminality and corruption, are unavoidable elements of our 
strives. On its way to the EU, Croatia pays a great attention to regional 
cooperation in justice and internal affairs. We start from the fact that there 
are certain problems which none of the countries in the region can solve by 
itseir.?9 
79 Speech by Prime Minister lvo Sanader at the conference of SEECP (South Ea t Europe Cooperation 
Process) Ministers of Justice and Internal Affairs, Zagreb 13 April2007. Available at 
http://www.mvpei.hr/seecp/docs/070416 _ Govor0/o20PVRH%20dr. %20lvo%20 anader%20JHA %20 E 
P.doc (accessed I 0 October 2008). 
CHAPTER3 
Civil Society and its Rationale for EU Membership 
The most important goals of various Croatian civil society groups are to help 
strengthen the competitiveness of the Croatian economy, raise the standard of living for 
Croatian citizens and enrich the country's cultural and social life. One of the means of 
achieving such complex tasks is obtaining EU membership, a status which would 
ultimately increase Croatia's capacity to manage conflicts that may arise with external 
parties and endure the volatility of the global market. Darko Marinac, president of the 
National Competitiveness Council, contends that: 
"For Croatia, conducting EU accession reforms has already been 
positively reflected in the domain of education, rule of law, quality of 
Croatia's business environment and investment in infrastructure ... "80 
The following chapter covers the attitudes toward EU accession of significant 
groups that act as spokespersons for key sectors of Croatian civil society, such as 
agriculture, fisheries, industry and trade. It also covers Croatian public opinion 
concerning EU accession. 
80 Darko Marinac, president of the National Competitiveness Council, quoted in Vjesnik (9 September 
2006.) Available at http://www.suvremena.hr/ 148l.a px (accessed 10 October 2008). 
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3.1 Croatia's Major Civil Society Groups: the Current Situation 
The lack of cooperation and interaction among Croatia's business organizations, 
trade unions, think-tanks, workers, farmers, fish producers and political parties, 
representing the interests of civil society, severely hampers the recognition, and hence 
accomplishment of their mutual professional and social objectives, interests and concerns. 
Certain business associations and organizations are either highly favoured or utterly 
dismissed from public life, depending on whether or not a particular lobby group, 
industrial or commercial sector or political party supports their existence, either 
financially or otherwise. The situation is especially serious in the agricultural sector, 
which consists of many food producers unaligned with any specific support network and 
which therefore represent too narrow an interest group on their own. Many of the regional 
parties represent geographically confined interests, and are thus perpetuating the current 
state of affairs - excessive regional fragmentation of certain interest groups; notably, 
farmers and fishermen, but also big food manufacturers such as bakers and fruit and dairy 
producers. The same can be said for a few ethnic parties, which are not so much limited 
by their geographic as by their ethnic focus : The Independent Democratic Serb Party 
(IDSP), The Party of Democratic Action Croatia (PDAC), The Croatian Roma Party 
(CRP) etc. Such acute fragmentation limits the expression of the legitimate problems and 
concerns of agricultural producers and others as well, thereby restricting their potential to 
collaborate amongst themselves and their capacity to make deals with their main business 
partners as well as the Croatian government regarding food imports and exports, prices, 
subsidies and opportunities for various rural projects. Even more importantly, excessive 
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representative fragmentation limits the negotiating position of these groups vis-a-vis their 
partners and competitors in the EU. 
As for overall public opinion, the level of Euroscepticism in Croatia is perceptibly 
rising, regardless of the fact that Croatians identify themselves as Europeans. The best 
illustration to support this is the chief slogan of the Croatian Eurosceptic campaign - "We 
need Europe, but not the European Union."81 This perception is reflected in the general 
revulsion amongst Croatians of all things foreign; particularly non-Catholic and non-
European values. Support for the EU does not necessarily coincide with the European 
identity and culture, but rather with massive bureaucracy and increasing political control. 
3.2 Commercial Sector Groups 
As regards Croatia's EU accession, the issue of agriculture needs to be discussed 
separately from all others. Agriculture is one of the EU's most important sectors; almost 
half of the EU 126.5 billion euro budget for 2007 was spent on agriculture. 82 That 
approximately three-quarters of all legislative regulations are directly related to the 
agricultural sector, when only five percent of people are employed in its various levels of 
production, speaks to its prominence.83 Not surprisingly, acceptance of the Common 
81 
"We need Europe, but not the European Union" campaign by Nenad Ivankovic and SIN ("Samostalnost i 
Napredak" or Independence and Progress), now called "Jedino Hrvatska" (Only Croatia), a union of25 
right-wing political parties. Croatian Radio and Television (HRT) news, 17 March 2005. Available at 
http:/lvijesti.hrt.hr/arhiv/2005/03/ 17/STR.html (accessed I 0 October 2008). 
82 See the European Commission Financial Programming and Budget documentation at 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/budget_glance/what_ for_ en.htm (accessed 15 October 2008). 
83 Ramona Franic, Tito Zimbrek, Premises for the inclusion of agriculture in the process of Croatian 
accession to the European Union, in Katarina Ott (ed.), Croatian Accession to the European Union: 
Economic and Legal Challenges (Zagreb: IJF, 2002): 162. 
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Agricultural Policy (CAP) has consistently been the most contentious issue for Croatian 
farmers. 
The agricultural sector has, by and large, accepted the inevitability of Croatia's 
EU accession, which is seen as a corrective, positive step toward tackling and solving 
long-standing, complex problems. Croatian food producers are aware of the positive 
experiences of other new EU members such as Poland, and with the EU-initiated agrarian 
reforms and their good results.84 They also firmly believe that the future of Croatian 
agriculture and fisheries, with their many comparative advantages, looks promising. 
Croatia has abundant water resources, a propitious climate and relatively developed 
agricultural practices. However, in the midst of the current global financial crisis, reforms 
and EU involvement in Croatia are still treated with scepticism. The country faces 
numerous problems and is in need of structural reforms regardless of EU accession. 
Croatia's rural population is rapidly aging, causing an overall drop in the rate of 
economic activity and an unfavourable polarization between young and old and urban and 
rural. 
Despite a great amount of arable land per capita,85 there are a number ofland-
related impediments to Croatia's conventional transition to environmentally sustainable 
agriculture: land registry disorder, excessive fragmentation of privately owned arable 
land, loss of agricultural land to ever-increasing urbanization, undefined supervision and 
84 
"Poljski seljaci porucuju: Udite u Europsku Uniju" (Polish farmers recommend: Join the European 
Union). Vjesnik (29 April2006.) Available at 
http://www.vjesnik.com/pdf/2006%5C04%5C29%5C 19A 19.PDF (accessed 15 October 2008). 
85 Croatia has around 0.65 ha of agricultural and 0.45 ha of cultivable land per capita. See Croatian 
Parliament, "Croatia in the 21 st Century," II July 2002. p. ll. Available at 
http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2002/147l .htm (accessed 15 October 2008). 
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use of government owned land, war-generated absentee ownership and a great amount of 
derelict, untilled and abandoned land.86 Damir Kovacevic, a professor at Zagreb 
University, voices his concerns over Croatia's EU entry. He says that "the problems are 
small and fractured estates, an old and uneducated population, dated technology, poorly 
developed market infrastructure. Unfortunately, Croatia has never had a farming strategy 
to address those issues. "87 
In addition, over 80 percent of the land is owned privately (i.e., as family farms) 
while the rest is owned by the government. Most of these family farms, over 70 percent, 
have no more than 3 ha of arable land and usually employ low-technology and low-
efficiency agricultural practices. In 2001, 10.9 percent of Croatia's population was 
employed in agriculture, making Croatia second only to Poland (27.4%) among the EU-
25 and CEE countries.88 What is worrisome for a sceptical Croatian food producer is the 
fact that EU accession implies that the system of government agricultural subsidies will 
be completely restructured and that payments to producers will no longer be avai lable 
from the Croatian state. Specifically, the EU, through its CAP, will allocate the resources 
most conductive to sustainable agricultural practices, which will prove beneficial to the 
few who are best prepared for such a great transition.89 According to the Resolution on 
86 Ibid. 
87 Damir Kovacevic, a professor at Zagreb University quoted in "Croatian fanners eager to access a wider 
EU market with specialty products," International Herald Tribune, 18 August 2008. Available at 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/08/ 18/busine s/farm.php (accessed 18 August 2008). 
88 Franic, Zimbrek, Premises for the inclusion of agriculture in the process of Croatian accession to the 
European Union, 166. 
89 Hrvoje Butkovic, K .A. Dujmovic, lvona Ondelj, "Croatia in the European Union: What can the citizens 
expect?" Institute for International Relations and Konrad Adenauer Foundation (June 2007): 15. 
the Strategic Guidelines for Negotiations between the Republic of Croatia and the 
European Union: 
.. .it is of particular importance to agree on adequate transitional periods 
and mechanisms related to the amount and pace of direct payments to 
Croatian agricultural producers from the budget of the European Union, 
determining of production quotas for particularly sensitive products, and 
deadlines for attaining quality standards.90 
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Croatia will be required to establish a new, specialized agency to facilitate the transfer of 
payments and regulate and direct the disbursement of funds to Croatian farmers and food 
producers from the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). Petar Cobankovic, former Minister 
of Agriculture, voices his support for EU membership and the benefits EU funds would 
produce, and argues that: 
The EU gives the possibility to all its members to shape their own rural 
politics, and projects are financed from the EU funds to amount up to 50%. 
Equipment purchase is also financed from the EU structural funds, which 
raises the level of agricultural competitiveness and its production. 
Agricultural producers would also raise more their profits because some of 
the income would be made from the sale of their products. The EU, just 
like to the rest of the EU members, will offer to Croatia a possibility to 
obtain the EU origin and traditionality trade mark for its food products. 
The Croatian market can also be more protected in relationship to the 
competition coming from the "New World", from such countries like 
Brazil and Argentina, which are big and competitively strong meat, milk 
and wine producers. By joining the EU, Croatia can also better champion 
its interests in other international organizations like the World Trade 
Organization (WT0).91 
90 
"Resolution on the Strategic Guidelines for Negotiations between the Republic of Croatia and the 
European Union," (Ministry ofForeign Affairs and European Integrations, 2005):3. Available at 
http://www.eu-pregovori.hr/DOWNLOAD/2005/ 10/28/Resolution_ENG.pdf(accessed 29 October 
2008). 
91 Interview with Petar Cobankovic, Croatia's Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in " EU nece Hrvatskoj 
zabranjivati proizvodnju tradiciskih proizvoda" (The EU will not ban production of Croatian traditional 
products) Vjesnik 29 May 2007. Available at 
http://www. vjesnik.hr/html/2007 /05/29/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c= I (accessed 29 October 2008). 
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Furthermore, Croatia's accession to the WTO in 2000 prohibited government 
agricultural subsidies and use of protective measures for its domestic products. 
Consequently, the competitiveness of domestic products, in general, was put at risk, 
unlike in the past when protection from foreign trade and extremely high import tariffs 
were used to ease the life of farmers and other agrarian producers. In 1997, Croatia's 
tariffs on foreign-made agricultural products averaged 25.3 per cent.92 Without imports, 
food prices in Croatia would skyrocket. The food surplus coming from the EU lowers 
average food prices in Croatia, but indirectly negatively affects the already non-
competitive Croatian food producers. 
As a result, the level of Euroscepticism among Croatian agricultural producers has 
become proportional to the level of Croatia's agrarian imports; the higher the level of 
imports, the more scepticism toward the EU is harboured among the farmers and other 
food producers. Currently, Croatia imports almost two billion euros worth of various 
agrarian food and non-food commodities annually, which, according to Bozidar Pankretic 
of the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS), 93 is ruining the domestic agricultural production 
sector.94 The levels of frustration and discontent, and thereby subsequent opposition, is 
growing among farmers toward the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water 
92 Ibid. 
93 The Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) is the only Croatian party that is exclusively interested in supporting 
troubled agricultural producers. Another party putting forth a considerable effort is the Croatian Pensioners' 
Party (HSU), which frequently protests against government policies detrimental to Croatian fam1ers but 
which does not have an encompassing policy solely focused on supporting agricultural and fish producers. 
For more information see how the Croatian Pensioners' Party' s protests against wheat price gouging "Nema 
opravdanja za poskupljenje psenice," Vecemji List, I August 2007. Available at 
http://www.vecemji.hr/home/manager/2075647/index.do (accessed 8 October 2008). 
94 A speech by Bozidar Pankretic, Croatian Peasant Party (HSS), 22 May 2007. Available at 
http://www.hss.hr/ (accessed 8 October 2008). 
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Management, which is, according to Pankreti6,95 a former HSS official, "a service agency 
for foreign lobby groups with no real interest in protecting domestic food producers." 96 
Croatian Farmers Union (CFU) officials claim that this situation favours importing and 
commercial lobbies, big wholesalers and large commercial chains that buy farm products 
and fish only from a few select individuals, disregarding the majority of small farmers 
and fishermen.97 Antun Laslo, president ofthe Peasant's Association ofSlavonia and 
Baranja (PASB) argues that "Croatian agriculture is facing bankruptcy .. . and this is the 
last chance to keep the Croatian farmer on Croatian land." 98 According to Laslo, the 
Croatian government is solely responsible for market discrepancies and food price 
imbalances. It needs to stop the import of cheap food staples from the EU, as this only 
benefits EU producers and a small number of Croatian importers, not consumers or 
domestic producers. For the last ten years, the Government's purchase of wheat from 
Croatian farmers has been organized under threats like "iii kuna iii buna" (either money 
or mutiny). 99 Various food producers have threatened the blockage of roads or ports, the 
95 Bozidar Pankretic is currently Croatian Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development. At the 
time of his speech in 2007, he was just an official within the Croatian Peasant Party. 
96 A speech by Bozidar Pankretic, Croatian Peasant Party (HSS), 22 May 2007. Available at 
http://www.hss.hr/ (accessed 8 October 2008). 
97 
"Proizvodnja hrane" (Food production), Vjesnik (15 May 2006.) Available at 
http://paor.blog.hr/2006/05/index# 1621 079801 (accessed 15 October 2008). 
98 Ibid. 
99 Croatian currency, called kuna, is used here as a reference to the minimum amount of money required to 
purchase one kilogram of wheat, as demanded by the fam1ers. Kuna is currently worth about 20c Canadian. 
See "Zetva psenice: Kuna iii Buna". Available at 
http://www.vje nik.hr/Htmi/2005/07/18/Clanak.asp?r-unu&c=3 (accessed 15 October 2008). 
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spillage of milk or destruction of crops, and as a result purchases of various subsidized 
food staples are increasingly becoming more of a political than an economic matter. 100 
Dairy farmer lvica BriCic, a former member of the biggest farming conglomerate, 
"Lura" and an agricultural program beneficiary, and whose farm will be subsidized by the 
EU, is sceptical of EU intentions and his prospects after Croatia's EU accession. Bricic 
reasons, "1 doubt that we can be competitive in the EU milk and dairy products market 
when our government does not care for agriculture; then again, we will know soon 
enough." 101 Stipan Bilic, Director of the Agriculture and Food Industry Association 
(AFIA) also cautions farmers and other food producers about the intense EU competition 
they will face after Croatia's EU entry. Currently, according to Bilic, Croatian farmers 
produce about 50 times less food than the best EU farmers and 15 times less than average 
ones. However, following the EU accession Croatian farmers will not be permitted to 
increase their production due to already large agricultural surplus within the EU. Unless 
Croatian farmers obtain or keep the same level of financial stimulus per hectare ofland, 
which is presently about 10-15% higher than the EU average, their li velihoods could be 
compromised, with potentially fatal consequences for some of them. 102 
Vinko Perinic, a former Croatian Peasant Party advisor, argues that the EU evokes 
fear among farmers because fear is, " ... a usual manifestation of circumstances facing 
Croatian people and different family and individuals. Peasants are conservatives whose 
100 Interview with Petar Cobankovic, Minister of agriculture and forestry, "Ruralni proctor ce imati najvecu 
korist of od Europske Unije" (Rural areas will profit the most from the EU) in Vjesnik, 15 July 2006. 
Available at http://www. vjesnik.com/htmV2006/07 I 15/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=3 (accessed 7 October 2008). 
101 lvica Brcic quoted in Zagorje, (23 February 2006). Available at 
http://www.zagorje.com/articles/2270/show.aspx (accessed 7 October 2008). 
102 Stipan Bilic in " Prije ulaska u EU dornacoj proizvodnji nuzne promjene," CroatiaBiz, 19 May 2005. 
Available at http://www.croatiabiz.com/info_ lnews-article.php?ID=24315 (accessed 7 October 2008). 
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first priority is always their land and family. They cannot, without difficulty, establish a 
dialogue with a society where materialism prevails and which does not want to recognize 
the true values held dear by the peasantry." 103 
Yet despite the general unease and fear, the agricultural sector is widely regarded 
as one of the few that would actually benefit from EU accession. More specifically, with 
a generally anticipated increase in food prices, accession is expected to burden consumers 
and bring gains to heavily subsidized producers. In fact, Dragan Kovacevic, the Secretary 
of State Secretary for the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, argues that "if there is one 
sector that will profit from the EU accession, that is agriculture." He also adds that: 
Production funds have already been directed toward bigger agricultural 
enterprises, which produce for the market. Small subsistence-oriented 
agricultural producers, those that just produce for their own needs, will be 
funded through the funds as well, because it is important to sustain life in 
the village. The village is a social category. In the EU, the question of the 
rural life comes first. 104 
The biggest gains will certainly go to flexible, market-savvy agricultural 
producers, notably the producers of organic and ecological food and produce, who 
continue their traditional production activities with a focus on priorities financed by the 
EU. Nenad Matic, a representative of Croatia's Peasant Party and a designer of the 
government's "Renaissance of the Countryside" program, argues that Croatia cannot 
compete with others in the region unless it changes its strategy. However, he is confident 
103 Interview with Vinko Perinic in Zadrugar4 February 2009. Available at 
http://www.zadrugar.info/content/view/290/37/ (accessed 4 February 2009). 
104 Interview with Dragan Kovacevic, the State Secretary for Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and one 
of the members of the EU-Croatia negotiation team in Vjesnik, 18 January 2006. Available at 
http://www.vjesnik.com/pd£'2006%5COI %5Cl8%5C19Al9.PDF (accessed 14 October 2008). 
in his relatively expensive products and believes that they will fare well in EU markets. 
He declared that: 
We cannot be a major exporter- we cannot compete with others in terms 
of quantity or price. We must look for particular market niches for our 
indigenous products, wine, cheese, plum brandy and to sell our home-
grown food to tourists. 105 
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In addition, Mario Sever, Croatia's first organic food producer, is very optimistic 
about Croatia's EU accession. He thinks the membership will "boost the ranks" of 
specialty food producers and improve his personal economic prospects. He contends that, 
"As Croatia will be getting closer to the European Union and as agriculture legislation 
will be harmonized with EU standards, our position will improve and the others would be 
hopefully encouraged to follow us."106 
The difference between long-term winners and losers in the agricultural sector 
will overwhelmingly depend on financial measures and the technical capacity of 
producers to adjust quickly to the strict health and safety standards of the EU and to the 
competitive nature of the common market. Croatia, with its extensive but underutilized 
potential where most food is still imported and where direct foreign investment in 
agriculture is a complete novelty, regards EU accession as a promising opportunity. 107 
105 Nenad Matic of Croatia 's Peasant Party and a designer of government's "Renaissance of the 
Countryside" program quoted in "Croatian farmers eager to access a wider EU market with specialty 
products," International Herald Tribune, 18.08.2008. Available at 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/08/18/business/farm.php (accessed 15 October 2008). 
106 Interview with Mario Sever, on of Croatia' s organic food producers in EUBusiness, 13 February 2007. 
Available at http://www.eubusiness.com/news_ live/1171166402.68/ (accessed 15 October 2008). 
107 Svrha je pomoci, a ne unistiti hrvatsku poljoprivredu (The objective is to help and not to ruin Croatian 
agriculture), Jutamji List (6 May 2008). Available at http://www.jutarnji.hr/clanak/art-2008,5,6, 118465.jl 
(accessed 16 October 2008). 
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Apart from agriculture, the Croatian fishing industry is an important segment of 
the Croatian economy, given its role as a major source of employment and food. The 
fishing industry significantly benefits from the great natural base that the Adriatic Sea has 
to offer. 108 The Croatian fishing industry, being primarily export-oriented, is heavily 
dependent on the country's cooperation with the EU, its main trading partner. 109 This 
collaboration brings huge benefits to the country and a large surplus in foreign trade. Free 
access to the EU market creates an incentive for a major overhaul of the Croatian fishing 
fleet and its current fishing practices, which would be greatly beneficial for the long-term 
development of Croatia's coastal regions. 1 10 Moreover, Croatian Fishermen's Guild 
(CFG) representatives believe that the country's accession to the EU would also foster 
better cooperation among the countries of the Adriatic and the Ionian Sea basins in regard 
to the financing of mutual EU fishing industry projects. 111 Croatian fishermen also expect 
108 Apart from being a Central European country, Croatia is also a Mediterranean country, with over 6000 
km of coastline and over 1000 islands. Croatian rivers are also of a high economic value, not only as a 
source of fresh water but also in terms of navigation and transportation. For example, the Danube is the 
longest river in the EU and the second longest river in Europe after the Volga. It goes through ten European 
countries and is hugely important as a water resource and for navigation and transportation, tourism and 
fishing. These rivers belong to the Adriatic and Black Sea basins and are some of the cleanest in the world, 
and are rich in both flora and fauna. Freshwater fishing also represents a share, albeit small, of the fish-
producing industry. Because most of Croatia's greatest rivers also mark the country's borders (Sava and 
Una with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Danube with Serbia, Drava with Hungary, Mura and Kupa with 
Slovenia), the use of river resources is often hampered by Croatia's disputes with Serbia, Slovenia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
109 Croatia is the only non-EU member of the Federation of European Aquaculture, and has signed and 
ratified the treaty with the General Commission for Fisheries in the Mediterranean. 
110 In order to comply with the acquis, the Croatian government has already made numerous changes in its 
legal regulations and procedures while trying to incorporate its fishing policy into the Common Fishing 
Policy (CFP) of the EU. As an EU member, Croatia will gain 3.5 billion euros from the European Fisheries 
Fund (EFF) until 2013. The investment will be directed into infrastructure, fishing fleet restructuring, 
research and development, diversification and enhancement of fishing products and occupational heald1 and 
safety standards. Croatia's alignment with the CFP will also benefit the environment and the sustainability 
of fishing practices. 
Butkovic, Dujmovic, Ondelj , "Croatia in the European Union: 18. 
111 
"HOK: Ina uvazila zahtjeve ribara" Vjesnik, 23 January 2009. Available at 
http://www. vjesnik.com!H trnV200 1101 /23/Clanak.asp?t=gos&c=2 (accessed 23 January 2009). 
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that their traditional fishing practices and gear, which are considered enriching and 
beneficial for all EU fishermen, will be protected under EU regulations following the 
country's accession. 112 
However, the most contentious issue for Croatia's fishermen regarding the 
country's EU accession concerns fishing rights and habitat protection on its side of the 
Adriatic Sea. Since Croatia shares the Adriatic Sea with its two more affluent neighbours, 
Slovenia and Italy, 113 it decided to pursue a "fishing and ecological zone" on its side of 
the Adriatic Sea, the so-called Protected Fishing and Ecological Belt (PFEB). 114• The 
Croatian justification for this unilateral action is the protection of the fish stocks, which 
are apparently being severely depleted by the much bigger Italian fishing fleet. According 
to the Croatian government, Italy deprives Croatia of 200,000 tonnes of fish, with a value 
of 300 million Euros annually, which is the ten times the value of the Croatian 
fishermen's catch. 11 5 The Slovenian government regards the one-sided activation of the 
112 
"Godisnji uvoz tuna, incuna i sardela od 160 milijuna dolara" AgroNews, 16 March 2009. Available at 
http:/ /www.agrokl ub. com/ a gronews/ godisn j i-izvoz-tuna-inc una-i -srde1a-od- 160-mi I ij una-do lara/799 I 
(accessed 16 March 2009). 
113 Slovenia and Croatia have repeatedly criticized each other in the past over a slew of issues and concerns 
such as failure to reach agreements over mutual borders, the Krsko joint management nuclear power plant, 
real estate property rights and Croatian depositors' savings in Ljubljanska Banka. The Treaty ofOsimo, 
which concerned delimitation of the territory between Italy and Yugoslavia, never regulated the maritime 
and land borders between Croatia and Slovenia and hence triggered a dispute between the two countries. 
Croatia is seeking international arbitration to resolve its border and fishing rights disputes with Slovenia in 
the Adriatic Sea, while the other side oppo es the international presence or demands an international 
arbitrage for the entire Slovenian-Croatian border, both land and maritime. Slovenia, with its 47 kilometres 
of coastline, is claiming access to international waters, a claim that is disputed by the Croatian side. In 
March 2009, Slovenia was the only NATO member blocking Croatia's accession into the alliance, due in 
April 2009. 
114 The Protected Fishing and Ecological Belt (Zasticeni ribolovno-ekoloski pojas or PFEB). This protected 
fishing and ecological zone covers around 57,000 sq km (22,800 sq miles). Malta, an EU member has a 
similar 25-mile exclusive fishing zone since 1978. See Giampiero Francalanci, Tullio Scovazzi, Daniela 
Romano, Lines in the Sea, (Genoa: Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 1994): 144. 
11 5 See the article "Croatia provokes EU fish ing row" BBC World, December, 31 2007. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi!europe/7166008.strn (acces ed 16 October 2008). 
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protection zone as an issue which endangers Slovenian sovereignty. Slovenian Foreign 
Minister Dimitrij Rupel and the Slovenian People's Party even went so far as to threaten 
to block several of Croatia's EU negotiation chapters if Croatia started enforcing the 
protection zone.11 6 The head of the Slovenian diplomacy argues that: 
Croats have the same attitude towards our diplomacy as some Slovenes 
have towards the Croatian sea. Many still live in the illusion that it is half 
theirs. Perhaps that is the reason why they care so little for the Slovenian 
sea. The underlying problem in Croatian-Slovenian relations is in that 
Croatians did not view Slovenes - right up to the accession to the EU and 
NATO - as a partner on equal footing. 117 
Croatian fishermen, although ready for a compromise, threatened to block their 
support for Croatia's entry into the EU if the Croatian government backed down from the 
PFEB. Croatia's fishermen were staunchly backed by the CFG, the Croatian Homeland 
War veterans and the Croatian Party of Rights, a right-wing party with an ethnocentric 
platform. Also, the Croatian Homeland War veterans, as well as the Croatian Peasant 
Party, 11 8 a junior government coalition partner, even threatened to exit the government 
coalition. Its former leader, Josip Friscic, warned that, in the case that the Croatian 
government backed down from the PFEB question, he and five other parliamentarians 
will return their mandate, instigate other parliamentarians to quit their mandates and 
11 6 See "Croatia May Soften Fishing Zone after EU Rebuff," by Reuters 12 December 2007. Available at 
http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/45942/story.htm 
Also see the Slovenian People's Party statement on Croatian protection zone. Available at 
http://www.sls.si/sllinside.sls?uid=766B6235-C2F7 - 141 8-69DB-161 ADD80F4 75&linkid=newsContent 
(accessed 16 October 2008). 
11 7 Dimitrij Rupel quoted in "Hurdle on the way to the EU: Rupel ' s 17-year war against Croatia," Nacional, 
6 February 2008. Available at http://www.nacional.hr/en/articles/view/42491/ (accessed 17 October 2008). 
118 Croatian Peasant 's Party (Hrvatska Seljacka Stranka - HSS) does not posses a great number of 
parliamentary seats, but being the oldest Croatian party, possesses a great reputation for standing up for 
Croatian national interests. 
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create a rift in the current government coalition. 1 19 He argued that "HSS remains firm in 
its decision against suspension of PFEB, which is required of Croatia. The demand for 
PFEB suspension is without a real argument. The demand is actually a pressure of our 
neighbours in regards to our border negotiations."120 President Stjepan Mesic had also 
vociferously supported PFEB implementation for some time: 
When protection of the Adriatic is in question, I believe in respect of equal 
criteria for all countries with their sovereign rights to enjoy international 
law rules and UN Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea legal 
provisions. Croatia will take necessary steps, after the country starts 
applying its jurisdiction over PFEB, to find a mutually satisfactory 
solution with two friendly countries, Italy and Slovenia, in our mutual 
interest. 121 
However, President Mesic, like the current Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, while initially 
supporting the application of the PFEB and disregarding warnings from such high ranking 
officials as Jose Manuel Barroso and Romano Prodi, was forced to back down, and 
withdrew his support for the Eco-Fishing Zone project. Petar Baranovic, the president of 
the Croatian Fishermen's Union (CFU), argued that Croatia's EU accession would not go 
well for his members. He accused Italian and Slovenian EU politicians of being unfair by 
"pressuring" Croatian politicians into suspension of the PFEB. 122 The rhetoric reached a 
pinnacle when European Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn threatened to block 
11 9 Interview with Josip Friscic, "Imao sam plan izaci iz Vlade" (My plan was to exit the government). 14 
March 2008. Available at http://www.jutamji.hr/clanak/art-2008,3, 14, 112235 .jl (accessed 17 October 
2008). 
120 
"Josip Friscic didn ' t want to answer if he stays a coalition partner in Sanader's government" Jutamji 
List, 12 March 2008. Available at http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/clanaklart-2008,3, 12, 111965.jl (accessed 
17 October 2008). 
12 1 Interview with President Stjepan Mesic on 23 January 2008. Available at http://www.ipazin.net/?p=705 
(accessed 17 October 2008). 
122 
"Sindikat ribara: Italija i Slovenia suprema nama nekorektni," Index, 28 November 2003. Available at 
http://www. index. hr/ vij es til clanak/ sindikat-ribara-i talij a-i -eu-su -prema-nama-nekorektni/1 7 3 064. aspx 
(accessed 17 October 2008). 
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Croatia's negotiations with the EU in the case ofPFEB implementation. Oli Rehn said 
that, "PFEB is like a cloud in the clear Croatian skies, and if not solved oon, it could 
cause a great delay in the EU integration process." 123 
An anonymous Croatian politician assessed the current situation for the Croatian weekly 
magazine Nacional: 
The situation with the Eco-Fishing Zone has gone so far that there can be 
no real retreat regardless of whether it is the opposition or the ruling party. 
At stake are no longer just economic elements, but national pride because 
we cannot give in on something that belongs to us by all right. Just a few 
years ago it could all have been settled quietly and, especially as far as 
Italy is concerned, by giving them certain concessions but if someone 
were to do so now they would feel a massive condemnation by the entire 
public. This is why I am not sure if any government will be able to solve 
this issue and not, in doing so, come in for a lot of criticism. 124 
In addition to the acknowledged prominence of the agricultural sector in Croatian 
society, the importance of the tourist industry is not to be underestimated, as it accounts 
for approximately 50 percent of Croatia's foreign currency earning . 125 According to the 
Croatian Hotel Industry Report for 2006, EU accession will have a positive impact on the 
tourist industry. EU entry will certainly benefit the country financially, and it will also 
polish Croatia's image as a member of"the European club." 126 Damir Bajs, Croatia' s 
Minister of Tourism, is very confident about the prospects of Croatia's eco and rural 
123 
"Ecological Zone Could Block EU Negotiations," Javno, 6 March 2008. Available at 
http://www.javno.com/en/croatia/clanak.php?id= 129666 (accessed 18 October 2008). 
124 
"Sanader promised Brussels Stay onEco-Fishing Zone," 17 October 2008. Ava ilable at 
http://www.nacional.hr/en/articles/view/38941/ (accessed 17 October 2008). 
125 See World Bank report on World Trade Indicators 2008, "Croatia: Trade Brief' 
http:/ /web. worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERN AUTO PI CS/TRADE/O, contentM 0 K:21393040- pagePK: 21 
0058~piPK:2 10062-theSitePK:23907l ,OO.html (acce sed 17 October 2008). 
126 The Croatian Hotel Indu try Report - 2006. This analysis was made by the In titute of Economics 
Zagreb, Croatia' s leading think tank. Available at http://www.huh.hr/userFileslhuh.hr/huh09.pdf (accessed 
17 October 2008). 
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tourism, which, according to him, can be combined with food and wine industry 
development efforts. He avers that "Croatia, with its substantial rural community, has a 
chance to take an initiative in sustainable rural development.. .through touri m." 127 
Tomislav Sokler, an executive with Hosting Adriatica, proclaims that Croatian tourism 
might experience its revival through Croatia's EU accession and that the tourist industry 
would undergo an instantaneous image upgrade and could only benefit from the free flow 
of capital, goods, people and services. 128 
Although Croatia is still perceived primarily as a tourist destination little i 
known regarding its industrial portfolio and human resource capacity. The countries in 
close proximity to Croatia, primarily the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and 
Slovakia, have already positioned themselves as high-skills/low-cost labour European 
countries. However, Croatian industries also have a good chance for u tainable long-
term competition with other, similar companies in the region, and not due exclusively to 
low prices. 129 Croatia, one of the most developed countries in the South-Eastern European 
region, also has the most diversified export structure. By accessing the EU, Croatian 
entrepreneurs are hoping to boost industry by embracing the innovative concepts, 
methods and mechanisms of various knowledge, human capital and technology transfer, 
thereby revitalizing production and commerce. Emil Tadeschi, the CEO of the Atlantic 
127 Damir Bajs quoted in Slavonski Poduzetnik, I June 2008. Available at http://www.poduzetnik-
sl.hr/contentlview/ 165/39/ (accessed 16 October 2008). 
128 Hosting Adriatica i a management consulting company specializing in travel and tourism industry. An 
interview with Tomi lav Sokler published in Tourisminfo, 2007. 
http://www.turizaminfo.hr/article.aspx?ar=266&to= 123&ma=21 &no=29 (accessed 16 October 2008). 
129 Robert Bajru i, "Blocking the negotiation would be an economic catastrophe," 12 March 2008. 
Nacional. Available at http://www.nacional.hr/hr/article /views/43593 (acce ed 17 October 2008). 
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Group and one of Croatia's most successful entrepreneurs, claims that for Croatia, the EU 
is the only viable alternative. He argues that: 
The European Union is the future of Croatia's development, and there 
exists a consensus between all relevant political structures, as well as 
actors in the private sector and non profit sector. The mutual European 
market is a very important aspect of accession from the tandpoint of 
Croatian entrepreneurs because it opens a much larger space for the 
placement of products, service and ideas. There is not enough emphasis 
that the reforms which we made and which we still face are necessary for 
improving our competitive capabilities in European and world markets, 
and that the European Union is the catalyst of the process which we must 
pass for our own benefit. 130 
Croatian entrepreneurs are expected to be innovative, proactive and, ideally as 
little-reliant on state aid as possible, regardless if it originates from the Croatian 
government or the EU. Essentially, the EU needs to be regarded as a partner interested in 
supporting Croatian transitional efforts while challenges that can be resolved prior to EU 
entry are addre sed. Croatian businessmen, entrepreneurs and industrialists are expected 
to find creative and effective solutions to their problems, which should not involve more 
of the same undesirable therapy - state aid. Nadan Vidosevic, the president of the 
Croatian Chamber of Commerce, agree with that view and maintains that the Croatian 
commercial and industrial sectors should look to their own inner motivation and resources 
to resolve current problems, and not neces arily regard EU accession a a quick fix for the 
current situation. Vidosevic said, "Rest assured, no matter if we enter the EU or not, the 
130 Emil Tade chi, the CEO of Atlantic Group, a Croatian company operating in the EU, quoted in Robert 
Bajru i, "Blocking the negotiations would be an economic catastrophe," 12 March 2008. acional. 
Available at http://www.nacional.hr/en/articles/view/43593/ (accessed 14 October 2008). 
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EU will not solve our main problems." 131 EU accession will only provide an appropriate 
framework for growth, where smaller entrepreneurs and industrialists alike can take the 
initiative to exploit their ideas and opportunities in a sustainable manner, thereby 
underpinning their ability to truly compete. 132 Along these lines, Tea Ganza, Croatian 
Chamber of Commerce coordinator for the EU, cautions that: 
By entering the EU, Croatian companies will have an easier access to the 
EU market. However, that also means the increased competition as well. 
Therefore, our entrepreneurs should use the pre-accession period to get 
prepared for this kind of market competition and to accept the European 
standards as soon as possible. Those that would not succeed will have a 
hard time surviving the foreign competition. 133 
According to the 2008 Puis opinion poll conducted among Croatia's 
entrepreneurs, only a third of them feel prepared for EU free market competition. 
Croatia's businessmen's greatest fear is the entrance of EU companies into Croatia's 
market. They do not really place much value on the fact that they can compete in the EU 
free market environment, and many of them feel that their businesse might be 
extinguished for good. 134 
13 1 
"Vidosevic: lz krize necemo izaci jos deset god ina, treba namjaki predsjednik!" (Vidosevic: We won' t 
resolve the crisis in the next ten year , we need a strong president!). SEEBiz (5 February 2009). Available 
at http://www.seebiz.eu/hr/politika/vidosevic-iz-krize-necemo-jos-deset-godina%2c-treba-nam-jaki-
predsjednik! ,36803.html (accessed 5 February 2009). 
132 COM (2004) 274 final , "Fostering Structural Change: an industrial policy for an enlarged Europe," 
Brussels, 20.04.2004. 
133 Interview with Tea Ganza, Croatian Chamber of ommerce coordinator for the U in "Hrvatska" 
pamecu I radom na zahtjevnom europ kom trzistu" (Croatia: with intelligence and work at the challenging 
European market) Gla Koncila, 2 July 2006. Available at http://www.glas-
koncila.hr/rubrike interview.html?news I - 7727&PHPSESSID=c7f(accessed 20 October 2008). 
134 
"Poduzetnici niSu spremni na clanstv; u U" (Entrepreneurs not ready for EU membership), Poslovni 
Dnevnik, 8 May 2008. Available at http://www.poslovni.hr/78909.aspx (accessed 20 October 2008). 
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In order to secure their own independent existence in the much more competitive 
global market, Croatian industrialists and businessmen are expected to implement EU-
encouraged and financed business projects, which would help their successful and 
sustainable entry into the EU market. These EU-initiated structural reforms will improve 
the performance of already faltering industrial sectors, providing a stimulating and 
competitive environment for large corporations while facilitating the growth of young 
innovative enterprises, preparing them for competition in the global market. Kresimir 
Sever, the president of the Independent Croatian Trade Union, argues that Croatia is not 
seeking entry into the EU: 
... because of the EU itself, nor have reforms been carried out 
because of the EU accession. Croatia is conducting reforms for its 
own benefit, that of its citizens and to reach the level already attained 
by other EU members. The real objective of these reforms is raising 
the quality of life for all Croatian citizens. This is a logical se~uence 
of events leading Croatia to a place where it naturally belongs.1 5 
3.3 Public Opinion of EU Accession and Influence of Media 
Despite the fact that support for European Union (EU) enlargement varies greatly 
across European countries, European citizens are still an integral element of support for 
further European integration. Popular attitudes have been crucial for the successful 
transformation of former communist countries into democracies and free market 
economies. A favourable public opinion toward democracy and a market-oriented 
economy in these regions certainly helps the EU to be the most successful international 
135 Kresimir Sever, the president of the biggest Croatian trade union, the Independent Croatian Trade Union, 
in his letter to the Prime Minister Ivo Sanader. The letter is available at 
http://www.sdlsn.hr/ _upload/pdf/nhs_sanader_zahvala.pdf (accessed 18 October 2008). 
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organization in the promotion of liberal democracy, among its eastern neighbours as well 
as globally. Such public support also eases the transition for new EU members as they 
embrace the latest reforms, consolidate democratic institutions and successfully integrate 
into the single market. Romano Prodi, former President of the European Commission, 
was quoted as saying: 
The enlarged Europe will certainly need strong institutions. But they 
must be democratically legitimate institutions that operate in a 
transparent and accountable way and enjoy the full confidence of the 
citizens. People want a much more participatory, "hands-on" 
democracy. They will not support the European project unless they are 
fully involved in setting ~oals, making policies and evaluating 
progress. And they are right. 1 6 
However, since the establishment of the ECSC, national political elites have been 
driving European integration at a speed and in a direction reflective of their own 
preferences. Consequently, the EU project favours those citizens that are wealthier, 
higher-educated and -skilled and who enjoy a higher standard of living overall. 137 The 
costs and benefits associated with EU membership are disproportionately distributed 
among sectors and peoples; a disproportion that generally favours business and political 
elites. Almost all post-communist transitional societies are suffering from uch a winners-
losers split. Tho eon the losing end of the pectrum of EU integration include elderly 
136 Romano Prodi cited in Rachel A. Cichowski, "Western dreams, Eastern realitie : upport for the 
European Union in Central and Eastern Europe," Comparative Political Studie 33, I 0 (December 2000): 
1244. 
137 Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Mark , "Doe Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on 
European Integration?" PS: Political Science and Poli1ics 37, 3 (2004): 415. 
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pensioners, state workers and women. Those on the winning end of the spectrum include 
young people, those who are highly educated and those employed in the private sector. 138 
Most members of the Croatian political and business establi hment and a 
considerable number of media outlets are approaching the question of EU accession a 
largely a cost-benefit issue. However, a rational cost-benefit analy i of European 
integration by the Croatian public is currently greatly restricted. Although Prime Minister 
Sanader often declares that Croatian citizens are "aware of the benefits and the costs of 
entering the EU," 139 the main problem tern from a lack of communication to the 
Croatian public of the most basic information regarding the EU integration. This 
'information deficit' is understandable given Croatia's non-member status, but the key 
problem can be identified in the citizens' lack of interest in the EU, 140 which in turn is 
likely due to a lack of the basic analytical and investigative skills required for 
understanding such a highly abstract and complicated enterprise like the EU. 14 1 
According to the recent 2008 Eurobarometer survey of public opinion in Croatia, 
only 24 percent of Croatians see the EU in a positive light. Additionally, only 23 percent 
of Croatians see the membership of their country in the EU as a positive development, 
while almost 38 percent of them express a negative attitude towards EU membership. 142 
138 Joshua A. Tucker, Alexander C. Pacek, Adam J. Berinsky, "Transitional Winner and Losers: Attitudes 
Toward EU Member hip in Post-Communist Countrie ," American Journal of Political Science 46, 3 (July 
2002): 558. 
139 lvo Sanader," roatia in the New Millennium: Toward EU and NATO Membership," Mediterranean 
Quarterly (Winter 2005): 5. 
140 See footnote No. 9 
141 D. Bagic, A. alinovic, "Analysis of benefit and harms as a f actor in citizen upport to O·oatian 
accession to the European Union" in: K. Ott, ed. Croatian accession to the European Union: The challenges 
of participation, (Zagreb: IJF, 2002): 164-5. 
142 Eurobarometer, Autumn 2008 - Croatia. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb70/eb70_hr_ exec. pdf (accessed 15 October 2008). 
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In the case of Croatia, strangely enough, despite its transitional statu , the mistrust 
projected toward the EU might in fact reflect mistrust toward the national institutions.143 
As Joseph Janssen asserts, "The issue of integration may be too difficult, too abstract and 
not interesting enough for the average citizen to form a well thought-out attitude."144 
Most often than not, the information provided by the media lacks real content and 
relevant information. As a consequence, the popular media have failed to improve 
people's understanding of the EU venture and have been unsuccessful in provoking bona 
fide progressive public debate. 145 The reasons for sporadic surges in the negative public 
attitude toward EU entry are the result of provocative, mainly political motives shaped at 
a rather superficial level for short-term political objectives. According to Bagic and 
Salinovic: 
... information provided by the media and politicians can be seen as being 
diffuse and confused. There are some media which do try to inform people 
about the EU (the special broadcasts of Croatian TV and Radio 101 , for 
example, specialised pages ofT-portal), but these effort are few and far 
between, scattered at the end ofbroadcasting schedules. Special broadcasts 
tend to appear every two to three weeks, at non-prime time . This kind of 
topic is not at the centre of the media, nor does it thus reach any significant 
proportion of the population. On the other hand, these same media often 
have stories that are over-generalised, quite often the product of ignorance 
and error of the journalist, and often with admixtures of scandal mongering 
and gutter journalism ... 146 
143 Vesna Roller, "Novi moto: udimo u EU sto bolje, ne udimo sto prije," 8 February 2007. Poslovni 
dnevnik http://www.poslovni.hr/33436.aspx (accessed 15 October 2008). 
144 Joseph Jan en, "Postrnaterialism, cognitive mobilization, and public support for European integration," 
British Journal of Political Science 21 (1991 ): 443-468., quoted in Christopher J. Anderson, "When in 
doubt, use proxies: Attitude Toward Domestic Politics and Support for European Integration," Comparative 
Political Studies 31 5 (October 1998): 572. 
145 Ibid., 183. 
146 Ibid. 
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According to the Autumn 2006 issue of Eurobarometer, overall trust in the media 
has shown a downward trend in Croatia. Presently, only one-third of people have trust in 
the Croatian media, which is considerably lower than in mo t EU 25 countries. 147 
Freedom House, in its 2007 Nations in Transit study, awarded Croatia a mediocre grade 
of 4.00. 148 This is a light improvement from the previous year, but still below par in 
comparison with European standards. 149 Even now, Croatia lacks a genuine alternative 
source of information, 150 i.e., a media outlet that can compete with the state-owned HTV 
(Hrvatska televizija - Croatian Television), which is currently a primary source of 
information for 70-90 per cent of the Croatian population.151 
Political leaders, in order to conceal their incompetence in addressing absent 
socio-economic improvements and lagging reforms, often engage in crafty media spins. 
They benefit from the fact that the EU progress reports on Croatia's transition have yet to 
be translated into the Croatian language and made available to the general public. Thi 
outrageous omission was uncovered by the Wall Street Journal, which labelled Croatian 
147 Eurobarometer, Autumn 2006- Croatia. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public _ opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66 _ hr _nat. pdf (accessed 15 October 2008). 
148 The ratings are based on a scale from I to 7, with I signifying the highest pos ible level of democratic 
f~0'~;~~; Nations in Transit- Croatia," Freedom House, 2007: pp.l63. Available from 
http://www.freedomhou e.hul/images/fdh_gallerie /NIT2007/nt-croatia-proof-ii.pdf(accessed 21 October 
2008). 
150 The internationally awarded Croatian newspaper Feral Tribune, well-known for its investigative 
journalism, has stopped publishing recently due to its inability to pay value-added tax (VAT) bills. 
Historically, the Croatian government had waived value-added taxes for many other, government-owned, 
media outlets. Yet Feral Tribune, a Croatian symbol of free press, will not get the same treatment, most 
likely because of it daring criticism ofCroatian government and politicians regardless of their ideological 
standing. 
See "Croatian Weekly Newspaper Stops Publication Because ofV AT debt," A ociate Press (AP), 14 June 
2007. Available at http://biz. yahoo.com/ap/070614/croatia media.html?. - I (acce ed 21 October 2008). 
151 Ibid., 164. HTV still requires mandatory subscription o~ its television broadcasting from every Croatian 
citizen with a TV set. 
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politicians a "Croatian Spin Doctors."152 The most blame was apportioned to Prime 
Minister Sanader, who, spinning the results ofthe European Commission's 2006 Progress 
Report on Croatia, reported "progress ... when it comes to reform ."153 However, the 
Progress Report was not praising the Croatian government on its reforms, but was instead 
highly critical of Croatia's reform strategy. The Progress Report tates that Croatia sti ll 
has "no overall strategic framework" and that "significant challenges lie ahead in the 
context of acquis alignment." 154 It has also been determined that growing popularity in 
Sanader's CDU is due to privately paid opinion polls, whose results were obtained 
without a valid representative sample. These opinion polls were undertaken in order to 
artificially inflate the popularity of the party. 155 Moreover, current statements by Sanader 
that "Croatian history will be written by no one but ourselves", 156 suggest the view that 
Croatian history is a question of individual or some elite group interpretation and media 
spin, and not of facts and rigorous historical scrutiny. 
At the moment, the most pressing issues for Croatian citizens regarding EU 
accession are the potential massive sales of Croatian seaside property as well as the 
potential disappearance of traditionally produced foods. While concern regarding the sale 
152 
"Croatian Spin Doctors" 15 November 2006. Wall treet Journal. Available at 
http://www.croatianworldwideassociation.com/ ite/epage/42764_57l .htrn (accessed 21 October 2008). 
153 Ibid. lvo anader issued a public statement which was posted on the Croatia ' s government web site, but 
recently has been removed due to negative pre s regarding this issue. Not available any more at 
http://www. vlada.hr/default.asp?gl=20070 1190000004 (acces ed 2 1 October 2008). 
154 European Commission, Croatia 2006 Progress Report. Evan today, the Progress Report is only available 
in English, French and German languages. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdfi'key _ documents/2006/nov/hr _sec _1385 _ en.pdf (accessed 2 1 October 
2008). 
155 
"HDZ populamost stranke pumpa na anketama" 24 Hours, 3 June 2007. Available at 
http://www.24sata.hr/index.php?cmd=show_clanak&tek t_ id= l9766 (acce sed 22 October 2008). 
156 A public statement by the Prime Minister Ivo anader following the vi it by Carla del Ponte (the I TY 
Chief War Crimes Pro ecutor). Available at http://www.jutamji.hr/dogadjaji_dana/clanak/art-
2007,7,13, anader_Delponte,82090.jl (acces ed 22 October 2008). 
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of prime Croatian property along the Adriatic Coast is to some extent understandable, the 
disappearance of traditionally produced foods was an issue used by some populist 
politicians for scoring cheap political points due to popular ignorance regarding how the 
EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is applied in the acceding countries. The best 
Croatian example of superficial Euroscepticism is a rather bizarre anti-EU campaign to 
preserve the tradition of locally produced cheese and sour cream. Such odd political 
campaigns are the outcome of a rapid decline, according to some almost 30 percent, in 
support for EU accession.157 Some farmers are sceptical about the new EU regulations 
because they think that the EU will force them to give up their only source of income. 
One of them said that: 
We regularly check our cows and have been producing cream and cheese 
for decades. Nobody has died of it. This is healthy stuff and we don't 
under tand why we would need to adopt any new regulations. If EU 
membership raises our costs, this would mean the end of small household 
production. Only big commercial producers would survive and they don't 
produce quality. 158 
Another example, similarly resulting in a surge of Euroscepticism, is the media 
hype over the extradition of several Croatian army generals to the ICTY in The Hague. 159 
The general who drew the most media attention was former French Foreign Legion 
soldier and war crime suspect Ante Gotovina, who became a national hero and an 
157 See BBC news article at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3838795.strn (accessed 22 October 2008). 
158 Marija lvankovich quoted in "Croat cheese 'threat' spotlights Euro doubts" BB , 29.04.2004. Available 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3838795.strn (acce sed 22 October 2008). 
159 The European Council confirmation of Croatia's candidate status in June 2004 has reversed the two year 
period of ri ing Euroscepticism and returned the public support for the EU to around 64%. See the EU 
public support poll by Puis agency, http://www.puls.hr/artmanluploads/cati-eu.pdf (accessed 19 October 
2008). 
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incontrovertible symbol ofthe Homeland War. 160 A general shortage of authentic 
information on such issues shows that mass attitudes toward European integration can 
easily be manipulated by hastily improvised political crusades, reinforced by impulsive 
feelings and irrational judgments. Rising frustration with the ICTY, combined, to some 
extent, with negative attitudes toward the EU, consequently fuels ultra-nationalistic forces 
and readily translates into violence, hatred and xenophobia. 
What is perhaps understandable in these negative mass attitudes toward Serb, 
Jewish and Roma populations, and the EU in general, is the underlying motivation of the 
Croatian people to preserve their own national identity and culture. Milovan Sibl, former 
Croatian Minister of Information and one of the main Croatian Eurosceptics, thinks that 
Croatia's new association with the EU will push the country into further turmoil. During 
one protest meeting against Croatia's accession into the EU, Sibl said that: 
The government violated the constitutional amendment Article 141., 
which can lead into yet another Balkan association. Prior to the emergence 
of Yugoslavia, Croats lived peacefully with Serbs for 1300 years, until 
western powers pushed us into a common state in which about 100,000 
Croats died.16 1 
In general, Croatia's strong national identity effectively diminishes public support 
for EU accession. 162 The most probable reasons behind the correlation of the popular 
desire to preserve traditional Croatian foods and a sudden re-emergence of 
Euroscepticism in Croatia following the arrest of Ante Gotovina are, to a lesser extent, 
160 See "Croatia honours day Serbs recall with bitterness," The Irish Times, 5 August 2005. Available at 
http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/world/2005/0805/ 1122072799809.html (accessed 21 October 2008). 
161 Milovan Sibl, former Croatian Minister oflnformation and a leader of the Eurosceptic block "Jedino 
Hrvatska" (Only Croatia - a block of25 different parties and associations) quoted during a protest meeting 
in Zagreb, 12 May 2007. More information in "Desnicarima iskljucili mikrofone" (Microphones turned off 
for the rights activists) in Vecemji List, 12 May 2007. 
162 Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, "Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on 
European Integration?" PSOnline (July 2004): 416. 
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the EU 'carrot and stick' pressures, 163 but also the reality that the Croatian people wish to 
preserve their own national identity amid overwhelming globalization pressures. Croatian 
people, to some extent, value the economic consequences and growth potential of EU 
accession, but believe that the EU is driving an alien cultural element into the Croatian 
cultural mainstream. After all, an appreciation for their group identity is what keeps them 
together, and plays a significant role in their perceptions of and approaches to EU 
integration. 
163 Croatian negotiations with the EU were at first delayed due to Croatia's supposed unwi llingness to find 
and extradite Ante Gotovina. See http://vijesti.hrt.hr/arhiv/2005/03/161HRT0048.html (accessed II October 
2008). 
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Summary 
Since the end of the Cold War, the main political development project in Ew·ope 
has been the stabilization and democratization of former communi t countries. The 
collapse of communism brought great hopes for the future, but a! o great challenges for 
the region as well. In the Western Balkan , the Croats began to entertain the idea of 
Croatia's accession into the EC back in the 1980s. German recognition of Croatia' s 
independence from the former Yugoslavia, on Christmas Day, 1991, briefly inflated their 
hopes of joining the EC. The newly establi hed post-communist regime ofFranjo 
Tudman failed to establish legitimate democratic institutions and properly transform and 
liberalize the formerly state-directed economy. While other East-Central European 
countries were rapidly advancing toward EU accession, Croatia uffered serious setbacks 
trying to settle the problems and failures resulting from the violent disintegration of the 
former Yugoslavia. The emerging country experienced a war brought about by the 
political elites of the former Yugoslavia, who were fighting for their own political 
interests. Croatia survived the war but accrued considerable costs to its people, as well as 
to its infrastructure and reputation. Corruption became widespread, while privatization of 
state enterprises failed. Many people experienced a combination of a dramatic drop in 
their incomes and an increase in socio-economic as well as political insecurity. Recently, 
however, Croatia has made great stride toward democratization and a free market 
economy and is now waiting next in line for potential accession into the EU. Following 
the Thessaloniki European Council, at which it was declared that " the future of the 
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Western Balkans is within the European Union," 164 Croatia became the second EU 
candidate in the region, after Slovenia, which joined the Union in 2004. When the EU 
commenced accession negotiations with Croatia in 2005, the event was greatly celebrated 
as a "second recognition" of its sovereignty, equally significant to the official recognition 
of Croatia's independence on January 15, 1992. 165 The reforms that were put in place, due 
to Croatia's obligations to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, delivered great results and 
placed the country on the path toward EU and NATO accession. Accession to the EU will 
be a historically significant opportunity for Croatia to take its permanent place in the 
Western world and become a more influential participant in the global community than 
ever before. As Ivica Racan, Croatia's late Prime Minister, once wrote: 
The central focus of the government program is association with the EU 
and NATO. This means that we want to develop our society based on a 
value system of a European democracy and to show that we share the 
objectives of the EU. These objectives concern the maintenance and 
reinforcement of peace on the European continent, the achievement of 
economic development and growth on the basis of free economic exchange 
for the benefits of all Croatian citizens, and the strengthening and 
promotion of social security and welfare. 166 
The reasons for Croatia's desire to join the EU are multifaceted, but all stem from 
the political, socio-economic and cultural benefits of integration. The Croatian 
government is primarily interested in firmly establishing the Croatian identity within the 
boundaries of Europe. With EU accession, the perpetual concern amongst Croatians 
164 European Commission, "The Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving towards European 
Integration," Western Balkans - Council Conclusions, 16 June 2003. 
Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession _process/how_ does_ a_ country _join_ the_ eu/ 
sap/thessaloniki_agenda_en.htm (accessed II October 2008). 
165 Jovic, "Croatia and the European Union": 85, 87. 
166 lvica Racan in Gorana Dojcinovic, What Does Croatia Gain by the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (Zagreb: Ministry of European Integration, 2002): 4. 
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regarding a Balkan versus a preferred European identity will finally cease to exist. Croatia 
wants to share in European culture and values, to participate in European democracy and 
have a free market economy. In joining the EU, Croatia will be better protected from any 
political, economic and even military challenges and be in a better position to defend 
itself in the political and economic landscape of a world gone global. Since Croatia has a 
legitimate right to protect its vital public interests and strategic assets and industries, as an 
EU member the country will have more control and more authority to influence outcomes 
within its own jurisdiction. The EU collective peace structure will be Croatia's securi ty 
guarantor, as long as it remains attractive to others who would like to join or do business 
with the EU bloc. Croatia needs secure borders and a stable economic environment to 
facilitate the attainment of sustainable socio-economic development to guarantee safety, 
and thus profitability, for foreign investors. EU membership commonly boosts investor 
confidence, and hence credit rankings, which consequently attracts more greenfield and 
brownfield 167 projects and a greater influx of foreign capital. Being a small country 
bordering the EU is a strong incentive to regard EU integration as a necessity, so as to 
eventually open up its borders to goods, services and investments from the bloc's 490 
million people. Croatian citizens would also have an opportunity to invest their money in 
foreign assets, real estate and financial securities, while legal entities and businesses will 
be in a better position to control and direct their activities and assets. Croatia's agriculture 
and fisheries, among other industries, as well as its natural and human capital, will also be 
better developed, managed and operated when placed in a more secure environment. 
167 Greenfield investment is usually a foreign direct investment in an operational facility where no such 
facility previou ly existed. Brownfield investment is an investment into an existing, abandoned or under-
used production facility to launch a new production activity. 
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Consumers will also benefit from a higher standard of consumer protection, as well as by 
healthy competition among producers and greater diversity in goods and services. 168 As a 
result, Croatian businesses and private citizens will be better able to equip themselves 
with the tools needed to compete effectively with other actors in the EU market as well as 
on the global stage. 
As a final point, Croatia's non-permanent membership in the UN Security 
Council, its forthcoming NATO and EU memberships and the 2008 visit of American 
President George Bush 169 are just some of the acknowledgments of Croatia's recent 
accomplishments. Croatia will finally transform itself into a European democracy, where 
human and civil rights are protected and where dictatorship is a thing of the past. EU 
accession will enable Croatia to undergo a transformation of unprecedented social, 
cultural, economic and political scope, whose outcome, at the time of writing, is yet to be 
known. 
168 Hrvoje Butkovic, K.A. Dujmovic, lvona Ondelj, "Croatia in the European Union: What can the citizens 
expect?" Institute for International Relations and Konrad Adenauer Foundation (June 2007):8-9. 
169 President George W. Bush came to Croatia on 05.04.2008 from a NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania 
at which Croatia was invited to join the NATO alliance. 
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